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This thesis analyzes the origins, growth, and legitimization of the standardized test 
preparation (“test-prep”) industry from the late 1940s to the end of the 1980s. In particular, this 
thesis focuses on the development of Stanley H. Kaplan Education Centers, Ltd. (“Kaplan”) and 
The Princeton Review (“TPR”), and how these companies were most conducive in making the 
test-prep industry and standardized test-preparation itself socially acceptable. The standardized 
test most frequently discussed in this thesis is the Scholastic Aptitude Test (“SAT”), especially 
after its development came under the control of Educational Testing Service (“ETS”), but due 
attention is also given to the American College Testing Program (“ACT”).  
This thesis argues that certain test-prep companies gained legitimacy by successfully 
manipulating the interstices of American business and education, and brokered legitimacy 
through the rhetorical devices in their advertising. However, the legitimacy for the industry at-
large was gained by default as neither the American government nor the American public could 
conclusively demonstrate that the industry conducted wholesale fraud. The thesis also argues that 
standardized test manufacturers were forced to engage in a cat-and-mouse game of pseudo-
antagonism and adaptation with the test-prep industry once truth-in-testing laws prescribed 
transparent operations in standardized testing. These developments affect the current state of 
American standardized testing, its fluctuating but ubiquitous presence in the college admissions 
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 1 
INTRODUCTION: ACADEMIC RATIONALITY 
 
 Proper education is a touchy subject in American society. The sheer vagueness of the 
concept prompts constant argument over what a solid education needs to encompass, how such 
education ought to be structured, and why existing structures need to be reformed. A cynical 
question lies beneath: who will—and who will not or cannot—benefit from such change? At its 
core, this debate bandies between the discordant perceptions of education as a consumable good 
and education as a necessary service; how does education reconcile itself amidst shifting societal, 
political, economic, and cultural agendas? More so, how do our constructs of proper education 
dictate our ideas on the relationship between youth, adolescence, and adulthood?
1
  
 Currently, the debate over proper education revolves around the vast growth of for-profit 
post-secondary education. With increased fervor, for-profit institutes such as the University of 
Phoenix, DeVry, and Kaplan University are gaining educational accreditation, sometimes 
                                                        
 
1
 No footnote can accurately cover the breadth of solid scholarship on American education, even if one 
cordons the list to research on Progressive and post-Progressive education in the United States. However, if one 
wishes to read some texts on this topic, please see: Burton J. Bledstein, The Culture of Professionalism: The Middle 
Class and the Development of Higher Education in America (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1976); Jo Ann, 
Boydston, ed., John Dewey: The Later Works, 1925-1953, vol. 1 (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 
1981); Lawrence Cremin, The Transformation of the School: Progressivism in American Education, 1876-1957 
(New York: Vintage Books, 1961); Raymond E. Callahan, Education and the Cult of Efficiency: A Study of the 
Social Forces that Have Shaped the Administration of the Public Schools (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1962); Abraham Flexner, The American College: A Criticism (New York: The Century Company, 1908); Susan J. 
Matt, "Children's Envy and the Emergence of the Modern Consumer Ethic," Journal of Social History 36, no. 2 
(Winter 2002): 283-302, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3790111 (accessed April 1, 2010); Mark R. Nemec, Ivory 
Towers and Nationalist Minds: Universities, Leadership, and the Development of the American State (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 2006); John Parringer, John Dewey and the Paradox of Liberal Reform (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1990); and Julie A. Reuben, "Beyond Politics: Community Civics and the 
Redefinition of Citizenship in the Progressive Era,‖ History of Education Quarterly 37, no. 4 (Winter 1997): 399-
420, http://www.jstor.org/stable/369872 (accessed April 1, 2010). 
 2 
through the acquisition of schools with standing credentials.
2
 In turn, more Americans are 
seeking an education at these institutions. At the turn of this century, for-profit and proprietary 
institutions conferred slightly more than 20,000 baccalaureate degrees, accounting for merely 
1.6% of all BA degrees awarded for that year.
3
 By the 2008-2009 academic year, enrollment at 
“[the ten] largest publicly traded for-profit higher-education companies” had been calculated to 
surpass 1,160,000 students.
 4
 When adjusted to include Kaplan University (which is technically a 
subsidiary), these figures exceed 1,250,000. Although figures for school enrollment by no means 
equate to figures for degrees conferred, one may infer that students are far more likely than ever 
to seek an education at a proprietary institution.  
 The author Anya Kamenetz asserts that for-profit and proprietary institutions are 
revolutionizing the concept of American higher education much like agricultural and 
engineering-focused land-grant colleges did two centuries prior. Further, “[t]he same kinds of 
controversies […over disrupting…] the classical curriculum” are erupting as scholars and 
                                                        
2
 Goldie Blumenstyk, ―Expanding Its Reach in Higher Education, Kaplan Buys Chain of Commercial 
Colleges,‖ Chronicle of Higher Education online edition, July 7, 2010, http://chronicle.com/article/Expanding-Its-
Reach-in-Higher/10526/ (accessed October 25, 2010); Goldie Blumenstyk, ―Kaplan Moves Beyond Test Preparation 
With Purchases of For-Profit Colleges,‖ Chronicle of Higher Education online edition, February 15, 2002, 
http://chronicle.com/article/Kaplan-Moves-Beyond-Test/4253 (accessed October 25, 2010). The breadth of 
writing—scholarly, journalistic, and otherwise—on for-profit education has also become quite expansive since the 
turn of the century. One useful source for news and commentary on for-profit education is digital archive of the 
online version of The Chronicle of Higher Education (http://chronicle.com).  
3
 David W. Breneman, Brian Pusser, and Sarah E. Turner, ―The Contemporary of For-Profit Higher 
Education: Mapping the Competitive Market,‖ in Earnings from Learning: The Rise of For-Profit Universities, eds. 
David W. Breneman, Brian Pusser, and Sarah E. Turner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006), 8. 
4
 Goldie Blumenstyk and Andrea Fuller, ―Enrollment Growth at 10 For-Profit Colleges, 2008-9,‖ Chronicle 
of Higher Education online edition, February 7, 2010, http://www.chronicle.com/article/Chart-Enrollment-Growth-
at-top-10/64024/ (accessed 24 May, 2010). Five of these companies—Apollo, DeVry, Educational Management 
Corporation, ITT, and Strayer—experienced over 400% growth in enrollment between the 1997-1998 and 2008-
2009 academic years. See: ―Major For-Profit Higher-Education Companies,‖ Chronicle of Higher Education online 
edition, January 23, 1998, http://chronicle.com/article/Major-For-Profit/99346 (accessed 25 October, 2010). 
 3 
theorists question the educational ethics of for-profit universities.
5
  But, simply comparing past 
to present obscures the broader issue at hand: the messily intimate interaction between business 
and education throughout American history. The arenas of business and education are fixed in 
neither size nor scope, and so one cannot presume that the area of interaction between these two 
fields has set constraints on its degree or depth. In turn, certain companies, industries, 
pedagogical trends, social phenomena, governmental interventions, and cultural trends have 
continuously redrawn this hazy borderline of acceptable and unacceptable interaction between 
business and education. Hence, it may be worthwhile to discuss how this space of acceptable 
interaction waxes and wanes. By what processes are businesses allowed to undertake educational 
goods and services, and by what processes are educational institutions allowed to engage with 
the free market? What allowed the for-profit sector of education to become so massive? 
 The clearest tangible predecessor to contemporary for-profit education is the American 
standardized test preparation (or “test-prep”) industry, particularly the field of SAT coaching. As 
Goldie Blumenstyk noted in an obituary essay on test-prep magnate Stanley Kaplan, the 
businessman “establish[ed] (for better or for worse) that there was money to be made in a 
business tied so closely to an essential element of the nonprofit academic mission.”
6
 Yet, this 
prompts a key question: If the test-prep industry created space within the American educational 
environment for business-oriented and for-profit enterprises, then what granted the test-prep 
                                                        
5
 Anya Kamenetz, interviewed in ―Kaplan University: A For-Profit Take on Education,‖ All Things 
Considered, National Public Radio, broadcast May 6, 2010; transcript available through NPR‘s webpage for the 
broadcasted story http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=126564748 (accessed May 31, 2010). For 
another look at Ms. Kamanetz‘s views in an NPR story, please see: ―The Allure of For-Profit Universities Grows,‖ 
All Things Considered, National Public Radio, broadcast 13 March, 2010; transcript available through NPR‘s 
webpage for the broadcasted story http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=124655777 (accessed 
October 25, 2010). 
6
 Goldie Blumenstyk, ―Analysis: The Legacy of a Test-Prep Entrepreneur,‖ Chronicle of Higher Education 
online edition, August 25, 2009, http://chronicle.com/article/Analysis-The-Legacy-of-a-T/48174/ (accessed May 18, 
2010). 
 4 
industry its own space within this field? That is, what gave test-prep companies a sense of 
legitimacy, and more so, what allowed these companies to broker this sense of legitimacy to 
other for-profit enterprises in the American educational sector? 
 Obviously, the test-prep industry‟s operational legitimacy is generated by the industry to 
which it is dependent: the standardized testing industry. Standardized testing is so ubiquitous a 
component in contemporary American education that one may have trouble perceiving an 
educational environment without it. This is especially true for the SAT (formerly “Scholastic 
Aptitude Test”). The exam has been administered to college hopefuls since 1926, initially as a 
supplement to the College Entrance Examination Board‟s battery of admission tests.
7
 However, 
the examination did not begin to become an ever-present facet of young Americans‟ lives for 
another two decades. In 1947, the College Entrance Examination Board (or “College Board”) 
collaborated with the Carnegie Institute in order to form the nonprofit Educational Testing 
Service (or “ETS”), which would be responsible for the versions of the SAT taken by the 
majority of college-hopeful Americans in the second half of the twentieth century.
8
 In turn, the 
test-prep industry did not truly take off until well after ETS gained predominant oversight of the 
development, manufacture, and administration of the SAT. 
 On the surface, it might be difficult to discern if the test-prep industry ever had a sense of 
legitimacy beyond this reason for being. Nonetheless, the purpose of this thesis is to analyze the 
                                                        
7
 Mildred Adams, ―Eager Rush of Students Swamps Colleges,‖ New York Times, September 26, 1926: 
XX5, accessed and catalogued as such in ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2007), 
http://ezproxy.lib.ucf.edu/login?url=docview/103663520?accountid=10003 (last accessed March 14, 2011) Do note 
that the term ―SAT‖ is no longer an acronym for ―Scholastic Aptitude Test,‖ and simply refers to the exam itself; 
see: Rebecca Zwick, ―Higher Education Admission Testing,‖ in Educational Measurement, 4
th
 ed., ed. By Robert L. 
Berman (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006): 648. 
8
 Allan Nairn and associates, The Reign of ETS: The Corporation that Makes Up Minds, (Washington, 
D.C.: Ralph Nader, 1980), 1-5. 
 5 
test-prep industry‟s search for and acquisition of legitimacy, and the aftereffects of this endeavor. 
The essay will maintain that, in order to establish legitimacy, the test-prep industry had to re-
orient the relationship between higher education, consumption, and adolescence in American 
society. In turn, this thesis will seek to explain how the test-prep industry brokered a sense of 
legitimacy within American education as well as American business, and why the industry was 
successful in doing so. 
 This essay shall also make three interrelated arguments. First, the test-prep industry 
established business legitimacy by generating and selling the notion of “dream insurance.”
9
 
These companies, most notably Stanley H. Kaplan Educational Centers (or “Kaplan”), used 
advertising and rhetoric that merged the realistic and the fantastic in order to convince student-
customers that their aspirations need not be pipe dreams.
10
 Test-coaches engaged in a rhetoric 
that eschewed business itself, and instead achieved financial success by arguing that one‟s 
performance on a standardized aptitude test was indeed alterable through concerted training.
11
 
                                                        
 
9
 ―Display Ad 61,‖ New York Times, January 24, 1970: 14;found and catalogued as such in ProQuest 
Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2007), 
http://ezproxy.lib.ucf.edu/login?url=/docview/118700807?accountid=10003 (accessed November 1, 2010). 
 
10
 The term ―student-consumer‖ (or ―student consumer‖)—which implies that a student, as a consumer of 
educational goods and services in a system with relatively little federalized and centralized regimentation, ought to 
be considered and protected similar to those consumers in the broader free market—is not novel to this essay. 
Sociologist David Riesman provides cornerstone scholarship and commentary on this concept. Please see: David 
Riesman, On Higher Education: The Academic Enterprise in an Era of Rising Student Consumerism (San Francisco: 
Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1981): 105-161. For several historical examples of the term—and a glimpse into its 
evolution, please see: ―The Profession: Reports and Opinion,‖ American Sociological Review 24, no. 1 (February 
1959): 87-112, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2089588 (accessed November 1, 2010); Harvey J. Goodfriend, 
―Viewpoint: The University as a Public Utility,‖ Change 5, no. 2 (March 1973): 9, 61-62, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40161682 (accessed November 3, 2010); David Halliburton, ―Education‘s 
Entrepreneurs,‖ Change 10, no. 10 (November 1978): 18-21, http://www.jsotr.org/stable/40177168 (accessed 
November 3, 2010); and Gary M. Armstrong, Mertin N. Gurol, and Frederick A. Russ, ―Detecting and Correcting 
Deceptive Advertising,‖ Journal of Consumer Research 6, no. 3 (December 1979): 237-246, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2488984 (accessed November 1, 2010). 
11
 Please see: W.V. Slack and D. Porter, ―The Scholastic Aptitude Test: A Critical Appraisal,‖ Harvard 
Educational Review 50, no. 2 (Spring 1980): 154-175; and R. A. Weitzman, ―The Prediction of College 
Achievement by the Scholastic Aptitude Test and the High School Record,‖ Journal of Educational Measurement 
19, no. 2 (Autumn 1982): 179-191, http://www.jstor.org.stable/1434572 (accessed June 10, 2010). 
 6 
The path of one‟s adolescence need not have dictated the path of one‟s adulthood, and by 
purchasing a prep course, one had the chance to alter or undo years of educational neglect. 
American adolescents with “quality” high course grades but middling-to-low test scores could 
demonstrate that they were indeed not overachieving beyond their natural aptitude.  This notion 
was in sharp contrast to the beliefs of ETS and the College Board, which maintained that 
standardized testing was a fair measure of aptitude, and that students‟ natural abilities could be 
easily measured and nurtured along a series of metrics. That is, if standardized testing was 
designed to better help “a student […] take from classroom instruction what is suited to his 




 Secondly, the test-prep industry brokered legitimacy through several channels during the 
1960s and 1970s.  The first channel was in the legal arena—most notably, New York‟s Truth-in-
Testing legislation, and the Federal Trade Commission‟s investigation of the test-prep industry. 
The second channel was largely cultural, as the American public began to reconsider the validity 
of standardized testing, as well as the concepts of aptitude and intelligence. The final channel 
was American education at-large. Several experiments in pedagogy during the late 1960‟s and 
early 1970‟s challenged the limitations to overt business influence and interaction in primary and 
secondary education. Meanwhile, the creation of the Department of Education in the late 1970s 
sought to put an expansive corral around the flock of American educational practices. The net 
result of this brokerage is that the test-prep industry became acceptable by default. The industry 
at-large was deemed legitimate because it was not conclusively illegitimate.  
                                                        
12
 Robert Glaser, ―Adapting the Elementary School Curriculum to Individual Performance,‖ in Proceedings 
of the 1967 Invitational Conference on Testing Problems (Princeton: Educational Testing Service, 1968), 4. 
 7 
 Finally, truth-in-testing legislation changed the relationship between the test-prep 
industry and ETS considerably during the 1980s. Both sides began to engage in pseudo-
antagonism and symbiotic adaptation. Although the test-prep industry existed because of the 
standardized tests manufactured by ETS and other companies, test-makers would have been 
operating haphazardly had they readily accepted such indirect competition. Following truth-in-
testing legislation, ETS repeatedly felt compelled to alter the structure of its examinations when 
it thought that these tests had become too trainable.
13
 Further, ETS took litigious measures when 
certain test-prep companies provided their clientele with material decidedly too similar to actual 
standardized test question. Test-prep companies were thus prompted to alter their techniques in 
order to remain viable sources of standardized test preparation as well as avoid copyright 
infringement prosecution.  
The forced transparency of standardized testing allowed student-customers to place 
higher demands upon the test-prep industry, but also allowed the industry to expand rapidly. In 
this sense, both ETS and the test prep industry had to operate with mutual beneficence in the 
1980s. The more that standardized tests became prerequisites for post-secondary studies or 
particular fields of employment, the more the test-prep industry‟s potential clientele base grew. 
Conversely, the more people who purchased some form of test-prep, the more potential profits 
for ETS, as those who felt more confident to take a standardized test were more likely to actually 
take, or retake, it. 
                                                        
13
 See: ―Next Year‘s Revised S.A.T. Is Here, and Already Students (and Parents) are Jittery,‖ New York 
Times, June 9, 1993: B7, ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2007) 
http://ezproxy.lib.ucf.edu/login?url=/docview/109145336?accountid=10003 (accessed March 1, 2010); Anthony 
DePalma, ―Byting the S.A.T.,‖ New York Times, April 7, 1991: EDUC23, ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The 
New York Times (1851-2007), http://ezproxy.lib.ucf.edu/login?url=/docview/108627151?accountid=10003 
(accessed March 3, 2010); and ―S.A.T. Schedule Will Be Reduced Beginning Jan. 1‖ New York Times, October 10, 
1979: B3, ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2007), 
http://ezproxy.lib.ucf.edu/login?url=/docview/123970732?accountid=10003 (last accessed March 14, 2011). 
 8 
Establishing Focus 
 Whatever validity these arguments have would be jeopardized if certain terms were left 
overly plastic and key concepts treated anachronistically. A distinction ought to be made about 
what “test-prep industry” will entail within this thesis. Although the publishing arm and 
publishing history of the test-prep industry will be discussed throughout the thesis, a greater 
focus will be placed on those proprietary enterprises that provide classroom or, perhaps more 
aptly, classroom-like instruction to clientele seeking improved performance on standardized 
postsecondary entrance exams.  
 More concretely, Stanley H. Kaplan Educational Centers (“Kaplan”) and The Princeton 
Review (“TPR”) will receive the bulk of attention. No other companies in the test-prep industry 
have received as much public visibility and scrutiny. Kaplan began as a semi-professional 
operation in the late 1930‟s by Stanley H. Kaplan, a Brooklyn resident seeking a form of 
employment after being rejected from medical school. Although Kaplan initially prepped 
students for the New York State Regent‟s Exam, he would find financial success in SAT 
coaching once the exam became widely-used by American colleges and universities.
14
 By the 
1980‟s, the company was the self-professed “world‟s leading test prep organization,” constantly 
adding new branches of the business across the country.
15
 Meanwhile, John Katzman founded 
The Princeton Review in the early 1980‟s. Like Kaplan over four decades earlier, Katzman was a 
                                                        
14
 Alix M. Freedman, ―Stanley Kaplan, Teacher of Testing,‖ New York Times, September 20, 1981: F8, 
ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2007),  
http://ezproxy.lib.ucf.edu/login?url=/docview/121677446?accountid=10003 (last accessed March 14, 2011). See 
also: Stanley Kaplan and Anne Farris, Test Pilot: How I Broke Testing Barriers for Millions of Students and Caused 
a Sonic Boom in the Business of Education (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), 26-31. 
15
 Display Advertisement, Barnard Bulletin, April 16, 1986: 12, The Barnard Bulletin Digital Archives, 
http://www.barnard.edu/archives/bull etin.htm (accessed March 15, 2010). This link appears to be defunct, and it 
seems that Barnard‘s extensive digitized archives must be accessed through the URL 
http://barnardcollege.newspaperarchive.com/ (accessed March 14, 2011). 
 9 
young New York City resident who parlayed a cottage tutoring business into a wildly profitable 
enterprise. Unlike Kaplan, Katzman did not have to wait for the SAT to take hold, and so his 
business was geared toward SAT coaching from its inception.
16
  
 Obviously, the qualification of “standardized test manufacturers” or “test-makers” is 
equally important. “Test-makers” will be largely referent to Educational Testing Service (“ETS”) 
and the College Entrance Examination Board (“CEEB” or “College Board”). These entities were 
responsible for the ubiquity of the SAT in the college admissions process during the latter half of 
the twentieth century. Chapter Two will also include a discussion of the American College 
Testing Program (“ACT”). Developed in the late 1950‟s, the ACT would become formidable 
(perhaps necessary) competition for the SAT in the testing industry.
17
 
 Furthermore, it is essential albeit difficult to set parameters for the concept of legitimacy. 
For the sake of this thesis, legitimacy shall be discussed in educational and legal terms. A 
definition pertinent to this study will be forged from other scholars‟ standards for educational 
and legal legitimacy. Stephen J. Thornton provides the most straightforward definition of 
educational legitimacy. He argues that subjects and concepts gain legitimacy when “they [come] 
to be broadly considered and accepted in American education.”
18
 Yet, Thornton also posits that it 
is the content of a subject, rather than the methods and theory used within a field, that tends to 
                                                        
16
 Gene I. Maeroff, ―2 Coaching Concerns Barred From Using S.A.T. Materials,‖ New York Times, August 
2, 1985: A1, B4, ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2007), 
http://ezproxy.lib.ucf.edu/login?url=/docview/111181556?accountid=10003 (last accessed March 14, 2011).  
 
17
 Rebecca Zwick, Fair Game?: The Use of Standardized Admissions Tests in Higher Education. (New 
York: Routledge Farmer, 2002), 11-13; George H. Hanford, Life With the SAT: Assessing Our Young People and 
Our Times (New York: College Entrance Examination Board: 1991), 15-21. 
18
 Stephen J. Thornton, ―Legitimacy in the Social Sciences Curriculum,‖ in Education Across A Century, 
the Centennial Volume: One Hundredth Yearbook of the National Society of the Study of Education, vol 1., ed. Lyn 
Corno (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 185. 
 10 
grant a subject public legitimacy. A similarly clear definition of educational legitimacy is found 
in Lawrence Levine‟s study of canons in American academia. Levine posits that educational 
trends gain legitimacy when put into action: “teaching subjects in schools and colleges gives 
them cultural legitimacy”; the volatility of the educational canon, however, tends to be ignored.
19
   
 Meanwhile, legal scholar Richard Fallon discusses the legitimacy of the United States 
Constitution by first arguing that the notion of legitimacy is itself multifaceted. He asserts that 
“legitimacy invites appeal to three distinct kinds of criteria that in turn support three concepts of 
legitimacy: legal, sociological, and moral.”
20
 In this sense, legitimacy is itself reflexive. When 
one challenges the constitutionality of an action or statute, one is really alleging that the 
unconstitutional item is illegal, socially aberrant, or immoral. In turn, the spectra of legality, 
social acquiescence, and morality individually define legitimacy, and so an action or statute may 
be of mixed and variant legitimacies.  
 This essay addresses legitimacy along several lines in order to fulfill its purpose. It must 
consider whether the test-prep industry gained public legitimacy primarily through the material 
covered in test-prep courses (i.e., question types, math review, grammar review, and vocabulary 
practice), or instead through the strategies and techniques developed for effective standardized 
test-taking. Did test-prep gain legitimacy in a fashion akin to subjects and fields in the American 
educational canon? In turn, the thesis must consider if the volatility of test-prep‟s methods and 
media were ignored once it became a legitimized educational practice. As the test-prep industry 
                                                        
19
 Lawrence W. Levine, The Opening of the American Mind: Canons, Culture, and History (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1996), 98. The author maintains that the denial of the educational canon‘s flux was particularly 
evident among academic figureheads during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century who initially disagreed 
with widespread shifts in higher education.   
20
 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., ―Legitimacy and the Constitution,‖ Harvard Law Review 118, no. 6 (April 2005): 
1790, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4093285 (accessed May 5, 2010). 
 11 
and the entire for-profit education sector has been involved in several federal court cases, this 
essay should determine if the judicial opinions and verdicts from those cases illustrate a 
multifaceted scheme of legitimacy.  
 Fourthly, the terms “youth,” “adolescence,” and “teenage” should be clarified, 
particularly when they are placed within the frames of business and enterprise. As Joseph Kett 
illustrates in his monograph Rites of Passage, most pre-industrial Western societies had a rather 
broad perception of youth. Once children no longer needed constant maternal supervision, they 
entered a broad patch of life that Kett deems “semidependance,” in which individuals provided 
monetary succor through labor in order to lessen their familial economic burden.
21
 In turn, the 
duration of a youth‟s education was considerably longer than that of contemporary standards, but 
seasonal work obligations often forced youth to routinely forgo their studies for several-month 
stretches, or to cease their education after the most rudimentary levels. An individual, or more 
appropriately, a male was generally considered an adult once he became a full member of his 
vocational community, often leading to a hazy border between youth and adulthood during the 
early American republic.
22
 Hence, Kett‟s research shows that American society has defined life-
stages, and in turn education, in economic terms since the nation‟s earlier eras.  
 The concept of adolescence emerged with industrialization, and has moved beyond G. 
Stanley Hall‟s claim that the life stage is “a new birth […] suggestive of some ancient period of 
storm and stress.”
23
 With this, adolescence is regarded as a natural process because it is merged 
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with pubescence. Kett maintains that Hall and other key early advocates for psychological 
approaches to youth tended to meld their notions of adolescence with their “positivistic 
preference[s] for studying religious affections.”
24
 That is, Hall spoke of adolescents as though he 
were speaking of those who found God through redemption. Kett‟s suspicions are affirmed by 
Kent Baxter, who maintains that adolescence was an element of discourse invented in order to 
provide a moral bridge “by which [children] could become adults.”
25
 If Nancy Lesko is to be 
believed, pervasive Western conceptions of adolescence have societal credence because 
adolescence is portrayed as a scientific—and thus, natural—phenomenon. (Conversely, those 




 Meanwhile, the concept of “teenage” adds another dimension to social construction. As 
Sarah Chinn quips in her study of fin de siècle immigrant adolescents, “[a]dolescent stroppiness 
has always been, after all, inextricable from the marketplace.”
27
  Adolescents have been socially 
and historically imbued with insouciance, caprice, and melodrama; teenagers have been socially 
and historically defined as adolescents who exhibit such emotions through consumption. 
Although Jon Savage and Grace Palladino disagree over the evolution of the concept of teenage, 
both authors concur that teenage is inseparable from capitalism; Savage notes the term 
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crystallized by the end of the Second World War to define “the adolescent consumer.”
28
 The 
economic nature for concepts of youth in American society means that businesses and industries 
may have the ability to alter such concepts over time.  
 Finally, this essay needs a brief remark about the study of intelligence. As Anna Ciaciolo 
and Robert Sternberg explain, intelligence is historically discussed through “metaphors to help 
[…] conceptualize intelligent metaphor.”
29
 The authors maintain that psychologists have 
discussed intelligence through seven broad tropes since the 1800s; intelligence has been related 
in “geographic, computational, biological, epistemological, sociological, anthropological, and 
system[ic]” terms.
30
  Spurred by the anthropological interpretation of intelligence, Paul Michael 
Privateer maintains intelligence, as applied in any arena, is simply a Eurocentric power 
mechanism. As intelligence has so thoroughly “shap[ed] social epistemologies and hierarchies of 
power,” its arbiters are able to remain in the dominant position of a social power dynamic 
without this imbalance seeming perverse; the dominant perception of intelligence is applied 
through science so as to seem natural.
31
 This literature on intelligence and intelligence testing 
indicates that there is a disconnect between what facets of intelligence are innate, what facets are 
nurtured, how these facets operate, and to what broader societal purpose the awareness of 
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 Such discrepancies may be what truly draw the history of the test-prep 
industry into the mainstream history of American education.  
Scoping the Literature 
 The historical research devoted to the test-prep industry is rather scant, and 
predominately subsumed within scholarship focused on the SAT, which is ironically a topic with 
a seemingly limitless scope of literature. However, there is enough research pertaining to the 
test-prep industry that one can say that there is a literature that exhibits several general trends. 
Research and scholarship on the test-prep industry can be broken into two broad (but clearly 
discernable) camps: scholarship on American standardized testing during the twentieth century 
that considers the test-prep industry intermittently throughout a broader narrative; and scientific 
studies which seek to gauge the level of improvement in students‟ performances on standardized 
tests after receiving some form of test-prep. 
 The first camp, in which the test-prep industry is discussed in relation to the bigger story 
of the SAT and standardized testing in general, is best characterized by the work of three 
authors: Nicholas Lemann, Rebecca Zwick, and Allan Nairn. Lemann‟s seminal text The Big 
Test frames the SAT as the byproduct of an Episcopalianism-influenced push by certain 
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academics “to reform—literally re-form” the way that the American educational system fostered 
an elite class following the Second World War.
33
 Lemann argues that the meritocratic ideal 
established by those individuals responsible for the promulgation of the SAT and other 
standardized exams was an ersatz form of egalitarianism. Rather, these exams were designed to 
create a new American elite through psychometric principles.  
 Lemann‟s depiction of the test-prep industry is overall favorable, particularly for Stanley 
Kaplan. The author stresses that Kaplan‟s appreciation for the opportunities provided by 
standardized testing, as well as his own educational credentials, were lost on the College Board 
and ETS. Neither institution accepted the notion that somebody who admired the SAT or any 
other standardized test would dare devise techniques from which students could improve their 
score. Lemann argues that “the passage of [New York State‟s] truth-in testing law” in the late 
1970s was the key broker for the test-prep industry‟s sense of legitimacy.
34
 Although this essay 
argues that other factors played equally crucial roles in establishing a broader acceptance for test-
prep, it will not neglect the evident role of truth-in-testing legislation in this process. 
 Rebecca Zwick, while taking a more reserved tenor than Lemann, does not refrain from 
criticizing the American standardized testing apparatus. However, in her text Fair Game?, the 
author also maintains that previous analyses and polemics against test manufacturers “[were] 
based on fuzzy and incomplete notions.”
 35
 That is, the dissatisfaction certain Americans find 
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with the standardized testing system stems from a widespread ignorance of its basic 
infrastructure and agenda. Zwick devotes a chapter of this text to the widespread, complicated, 
and mis-analyzed test-prep industry. However, Zwick is less receptive toward the industry than 
Lemann as she places coaching on the same spectrum as cheating.
36
 While Zwick does refer to 
instances of test-coaching (and cheating) on British and Chinese entrance exams prior to the 
twentieth century, she neglects the American test-prep industry prior to the mid-1970s.
37
 In turn, 
Zwick argues that the Federal Trade Commission‟s investigation of the test-prep industry did not 
provide test-coaching the legitimacy it had sought. This thesis shall argue to the contrary. 
Nonetheless, Zwick does stress “that the duration, focus, and quality of coaching” makes any 
study of the industry an inherently difficult endeavor.
38
 Hence, this essay shall attempt to 
embrace the multifaceted nature of the industry while also biasing its attention toward nationally-
known companies for the sake of narrative continuity and intra-industrial comparison. 
 Perhaps the most well-known polemic against Educational Testing Service and 
standardized testing in general is Allan Nairn‟s The Reign of ETS. Mentored by Ralph Nader, 
Nairn spares no vitriol for the nonprofit agency, and smears the test-prep industry in the process. 
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The author regards coaching schools as “a respectable form of cheating.”
39
 Test-prep 
entrepreneur Robert Scheller is quoted as having taken advantage of ETS‟s registration policies 
in order to sit for the SAT and memorize examination questions; customers benefitted from the 
disreputable actions of others without feeling that they themselves have crossed ethical bounds. 
To Nairn, whose research helped fuel the push for truth-in-testing legislation, coaching schools 
profited from selling the bounty of their outright theft at a premium price, thereby reinforcing the 
relationship between a student‟s SAT scores and his or her family‟s income.
40
  
 In this sense, Nairn‟s consideration of the test-prep industry is used as documentary 
evidence that unethical or, at least, unsavory practices stemmed from ETS and the broader 
standardized testing apparatus. This argument continues in far more recent works, albeit 
increasingly divorced from Nairn‟s original indictments against standardized testing. Written in 
2010, Michael Riccards‟s slim narrative on the history of the College Board devotes a single 
paragraph to the test-prep industry, which is dismissed as an institution of the well-to-do that 
profited from selling “skills or „tricks‟” for mastering any standardized test.
41
 However, Riccards 
keenly refers to test-prep as a “cottage industry,” a framework worth minding in this thesis.
42
 
 The focus of the second camp of research is not so much recalling the history of test-prep 
as determining test-coaching‟s degree of usefulness on the SAT and other entrance exams. What 
complicates the trends in this section of literature is the relationship between certain scientists 
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and the standardized testing industry. The College Board and ETS frequently funded research on 
standardized test validity and coachability. Two sources illustrate this issue wonderfully. The 
first, The Effect of Coaching on Scholastic Aptitude Test Scores, contains the findings from seven 
College Board-funded studies which uphold the notion that the SAT was not coachable. These 
studies, which were conducted in the 1950s and early 1960s, as well as the pamphlet‟s 
introductory official statement give a clear indication of test manufacturers‟ early disdain of test-
prep.
43
 The second, Abstracts from the Research and Development Report Series, 1963-1981, 
contains digests for ETS studies on standardized testing in that eighteen-year period. Many of 
these studies concerned the SAT, and several investigated the exam‟s level of coachability.
44
 
 Not all research on the SAT‟s degree of coachability had the College Board or ETS‟s 
approval, but one must not presume that these are without their own complications. Warner 
Slack and Douglas Porter‟s seminal 1980 essay for the Harvard Educational Review, in which 
the authors condemn the College Board and ETS for perpetuating misperceptions of the SAT, 
was itself a meta-analysis.
45
 That is, Slack and Porter derived their findings and criticism from 
the statistically synthesized results from previous studies on SAT coaching. The discretion of 
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researchers in selecting what studies go into a meta-analysis may lead to a fundamental bias in 
the results of a meta-analysis. 
 Establishing Direction 
 The following discussion of the test-prep industry's acquisition of legitimacy shall be 
broken into three chapters and a conclusion. The first chapter will focus on the test-prep industry 
between 1946 and 1975, and how the test-prep industry slowly developed a sense of legitimacy 
through advertising. In particular, this chapter will discuss the growth of Stanley H. Kaplan 
Educational Centers, how its advertising was markedly different than its competition, and why 
these differences may have helped the industry at-large develop greater legitimacy. Meanwhile, 
the chapter will also discuss the origins and development of Educational Testing Service, and 
how certain facets of this non-profit may have inadvertently fostered an educational environment 
beneficial to the growth of the test-prep industry.  
 
 Chapter One‟s analysis of the style and evolution of the advertising used by Kaplan and 
other contemporaneous test-prep companies will serve four key functions. First, these 
advertisements will help show the relationship between Kaplan‟s public projection and the 
company‟s self-perception as a “poor man‟s private school,” as well as the differences between 
Kaplan‟s self-portrayal and that of its competition.
46
  Secondly, indicating when and where 
Kaplan and its competition placed advertisements will determine the extent that direct 
advertisement influenced the growth and overt presence of the industry. Thirdly, this analysis 
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will show what information these ads omitted, particularly in terms of pricing and preparatory 
content. Finally, these advertisements can be a useful source for deconstruction. Analyzing the 
language and imagery used within these ads will show how Kaplan and its ilk engaged readers 
(and potential clientele) in a rhetoric that merged the realistic and the fantastic; an SAT prep 
course was portrayed not a as commodity, but rather as “dream insurance.”
47
  
 The second chapter will analyze how the test-prep industry brokered legitimacy through 
several arenas during the 1960s and 1970s. The first arena was the business world, best 
illustrated with the Federal Trade Commission Bureau of Consumer Protection‟s investigation of 
“test-coaching.”
48
 The resultant FTC report was an investigation of certain portions of the test-
prep industry, and whether they were abiding by legitimate business practices. The second arena, 
exemplified by the Nairn Report and New York State‟s truth-in-testing legislation, was the 
cultural debate over the validity of standardized aptitude tests. Both test manufacturers and the 
test-prep industry garnered public distrust. Contradictory concepts of aptitude were used by test-
makers and test-coachers, leading to public confusion (and dismay) over what standardized tests 
measured, whether they had any relevance to collegiate success, whether coaching produced 
genuine improvement in test scores, and if coaching gave undue advantage to those who could 
afford test-prep. 
 But, this chapter will also show that the test-prep industry accrued legitimacy through 
channels in which it had little if any direct involvement. Certain trends and experiments in 
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American education at-large during the 1960s and 1970s, such as performance contracting and 
school voucher programs, aided in giving the test-prep industry greater legitimacy by directly 
addressing "the [demand] of education consumers" in public schooling.
49
 Proponents maintained 
that education, while a necessity, was subject to the same market conditions as other vital goods 
and services, and that the boundaries of acceptable overt interaction between business and 
education ought to be expanded.
50
  Meanwhile, the creation of the Department of Education in 
the late 1970s also allowed the test-prep industry to claim a greater sense of legitimacy. The 
Carter Administration‟s push for a separate cabinet-level education department led to a relatively 
neutered bureaucratic apparatus that lacked any genuine ability to proscribe educational practices 
that had already been deemed acceptable and legal. The net effect of the developments in all of 
these channels during the 1960s and 1970s was that the test-prep industry gained legitimacy by 
default. The industry was acceptable because no party had been able to conclusively prove the 
industry was wholly unacceptable.  
 The third chapter will discuss the expansion of the test-prep industry during the 1980s. 
Following truth-in-testing legislation, the relationship between test-manufacturers and the test-
prep industry shifted. Both parties began to engage in pseudo-antagonism and symbiotic 
adaptation. That is, test-makers and test-prep companies both behaved in ways that seemed to 
threaten the operational integrity of the other side, but actually compelled both parties to adapt in 
ways that, directly or indirectly, benefitted all involved in standardized testing.  
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 Most notably, the test-prep industry developed a broader competitive field. The 
industry‟s balance of power altered dramatically after John Katzman founded The Princeton 
Review (or “TPR”) in 1981. TPR gained clientele with its staunchly antipathetic view toward the 
SAT and its alleged capabilities, claiming that a student‟s performance on a standardized exam 
was solely indicative of their ability to perform well on such tests.
51
 This view, as seen in 
Katzman‟s statements to the media as well as TPR‟s print advertisements, was markedly distinct 
from that of TPR‟s largest competitor at the time, Kaplan.
52
  Hence, standardized test-
manufacturers were forced to contend with additional test-prep companies that provided multiple 
ways to systematically approach the test, and had differing strategies to court clientele. How else 
could the College Board respond but to enter the field itself? 
 But, the growth of The Princeton Review also caused the relationship between 
standardized test-manufacturers and the test-prep industry to take a decidedly litigious bent in the 
1980s. This is illustrated by the 1986 U.S. District Court for New Jersey case (and its subsequent 
appeal to the Third Circuit) ETS vs. John Katzman and The Princeton Review, Inc., in which the 
nonprofit sued The Princeton Review and its president for copyright infringement.
53
 Meanwhile, 
Kaplan‟s actions during the 1980s demonstrate that the test-prep industry also achieved a sense 
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of legitimacy by proxy. The company, which by then had become a highly profitable nationwide 
corporation, was acquired by The Washington Post Company in 1985.
54
  Kaplan‟s transition 
from a successful, tightly-knit independent corporation to a highly-profitable subsidiary of a 
media parent company may have spurred further shifts in the relationship between ETS and the 
test-prep industry. The net effect of the developments within the test-prep industry during the 
1980s was a sense of permanence. Too many parties, including the test-makers, had a vested 
interest in the industry. No company within the industry held a business or an ideological quasi-
monopoly, and the forced transparency of standardized testing guaranteed that the industry could 
quickly adapt to whatever changes standardized test-makers made to their exams.  
 The thesis will conclude with final remarks about the research, a reconsideration of how 
the development of the test-prep industry relates to the current state and crises in American 
education at-large, and most importantly, a discussion of possible directions for future historical 
studies on the test-prep industry. Following that, the appendix contains an overview of the test-
prep industry during the 1990s and 2000s. Ultimately, any discussion of for-profit pursuits in 
American education, whatever their manifestations, is inherently politically charged. 
Conservative groups such as the Cato Institute laud proprietary endeavors as effective 
alternatives to the bloated and “stagnant public school system,” and claim that these 
“edupreneurs” demonstrate the government‟s ineffective and illegitimate claim to serve public 
welfare.
55
 Meanwhile, liberal commentators look at corporate interference in educational 
content, such as the secondary school science material developed by BPAmoco, as a means to 
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“defund the public sector […as well as] redefine the public schools as sources for private 
profit.”
56
 In a sense, the intersection of business and education becomes politicized, or rather, 
becomes publicly controversial, when it becomes visible. It is easy to ignore that which we 
cannot see or give a name. If anything, this essay shall be a discussion of this invisibility, and 
how American society has dealt with it.  
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CHAPTER ONE: STANLEY KAPLAN, EDUCATIONAL TESTING 
SERVICE, AND THE ART OF ADVERTISING, 1946-1975 
 
I‟ll never forget my introduction to the SAT. It was 1946. I was at the home of a 
high school junior named Elizabeth, who lived near Coney Island, to help her 
with intermediate algebra. As we sat down at her kitchen table, she said, “Mr. 
Kaplan, I need to take an important test. It‟s called the SAT. Can you help me?‟ 
[…] I looked at the sample questions, and a broad smile stretched across my face. 
It was love at first sight. 




 According to the self-styled lore found in his autobiography Test Pilot, Stanley H. Kaplan 
opened an independent tutoring business in his parents‟ home in 1938 following his rejection 
from medical school. Stanley H. Kaplan Educational Center later became the largest 
standardized test-preparation (“test-prep”) business in the nation. As seen by the above quote, the 
Scholastic Aptitude Test (“SAT”) was not the impetus of Kaplan‟s business. Founded in the 
Flatbush neighborhood of Brooklyn, Kaplan originally specialized in preparation for the New 
York State Regents Exam. As the proprietor noted, “scoring well on the Regents was the surest 
ticket for middle-class public school kids to go to college.”
58
 Yet, test-prep for the SAT would 
become Kaplan‟s mainstay, earning his business a reputation (or infamy) in the process. 
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 As the author Nicholas Lemann notes, Kaplan built a loyal customer base in his native 
Brooklyn during the business‟s early years of operation, taking in clientele from the central and 
southern portions of the heavily-populated borough. The entrepreneur‟s initial clientele typically 
consisted of working- and middle-class Jewish high-schoolers in Brooklyn, mainly third-
generation Americans.
59
 These customers had educational experiences similar to Kaplan‟s, and 
the entrepreneur saw his company as a way to help counteract the prevailing anti-Semitism in 
higher education that he himself had endured in the 1930s. Being “lower-middle-class, Jewish, 
[and] public-school-educated,” Kaplan saw standardized tests, and in turn test-prep, as a way to 
create a fairer system of admissions in higher education.
60
 
 Due to this admiration for standardized testing, the businessman believed that the courses 
offered at Stanley H. Kaplan Education Center served as a “poor man‟s private school.”
61
 While 
the upfront cost of a Kaplan SAT prep course may have seemed steep, the alleged result of a 
significantly improved performance on college entrance exams would have placed a student on 
seeming parity with one who had paid far more to receive an elite private education. Educational 
disparities that one could not control (e.g., household wealth and purchasing power) could be 
leveled off through a prep course. College admissions would thus be more equitable. 
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 Soon after Kaplan‟s fateful meeting with Elizabeth, he offered his first preparatory course 
for the SAT. The course, which “consisted of four-hour weekly classes lasting sixteen weeks,” 
cost $128.
62
 When adjusted for inflation, the $128 spent on Kaplan‟s first SAT prep course in 
1946 would be equivalent to spending over $1430 on the same product in 2010. 
63
  Moreover, 
this fee for SAT coaching was for each individual student. For example, had five students 
enrolled in Kaplan‟s first SAT prep course, then each student would have paid $128 for the same 
sixty-four hours of instruction and instructional material. Kaplan would have thus made $640, or 
ten dollars per hour, for the same sixty-four hours of teaching. The entrepreneur claimed that he 
had 200 clients for SAT coaching within his first year of offering the service.
64
 Were all of these 
clients to have been enrolled in Kaplan‟s SAT prep course, then Kaplan would have netted 
$25,600 solely off of this facet of his business within its first year. 
 This figure—128 dollars for 64 hours of SAT-prep instruction—gains better meaning 
when placed within the context of national income standards for the time.  The American median 
income in 1947 was $2,685, and by 1950, this figure had risen to $2,990.
65
 An average American 
family during this four-year span would have had to contribute between 4.28% and 4.77% of its 
yearly income in order to afford a Kaplan SAT prep course, had the opportunity been available 
nationwide. Yet, when one segregates median income levels by race, a stark contrast emerges.  
Between 1947 and 1950, white American families‟ median income grew from $3,157 to $3,445, 
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but nonwhite American families‟ median income rose from $1,614 to $1,869.
66
 Whereas the 
average white family would have only had to contribute between 3.72% and 4.05% of its income 
in order to afford Kaplan‟s first SAT prep course, the average nonwhite family would have had 
to contribute between 6.85% and 7.93% of its annual income to do so.  
 However, any discussion of the test-prep industry‟s early decades cannot focus on 
Stanley Kaplan alone, nor can it discuss Kaplan or other such businesses without broader 
historical context. This chapter will thus first discuss the demographics for New York City and 
State during the late 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s in order to gauge the social and economic 
atmosphere of the area during the early years of Kaplan‟s business. Then, the chapter will 
discuss the development and first decade of Educational Testing Service (“ETS”) in order to 
explain the preponderance of standardized testing during the 1950s, illustrate the company‟s 
early position against test-prep, and show the fascinations shared by both ETS and test-prep 
companies. Finally, this chapter will analyze the print advertising of test-prep companies from 
the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. This will show how, and in which publications, these businesses 
courted the public, which test-prep goods were advertised, where companies tended to advertise, 
what rhetorical and linguistic devices these companies used, and why certain companies such as 
Kaplan found greater success in the print advertising medium. 
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A Numbers Game 
 Any analysis of Kaplan‟s early entrepreneurial approaches and initial SAT course costs 
would be unfair if solely based on national figures as one cannot presume the demographics for 
New York State, much less New York City, were in lockstep with the rest of the nation. Instead, 
it would be more prudent to explore the demographics for Brooklyn, New York City and New 
York State during the 1930s and 1940s in order to better understand atmosphere of the borough 
when Mr. Kaplan decided to begin his business. Following that, it would make sense to compare 
Kaplan and his chosen profession against other New Yorkers working in education in 1940. This 
comparison will help better determine if Kaplan was truly anomalous or part of a broader trend 
in educational proprietorship. 
 In 1940, Kings County, which is coterminous with the Borough of Brooklyn, had 
2,698,285 residents, of whom nearly 96% were white.
67
 Kings was the most populous county in 
New York at the time, and a highly racially homogeneous one as well. (But, ironically, only four 
of the state‟s sixty-one other counties were less homogeneous.) More telling are the county‟s 
educational statistics. In 1940, 77.4 percent of Brooklyn‟s residents over age twenty-five had 
completed “5 or more grades” of schooling.
68
 Although this figure was high for the decade in 
relation to other areas of the nation, Kings County had the second-lowest such figure in New 
York State. Only Rockland County had proportionally fewer residents who completed primary-
level education.  In turn, fewer than one in five adult residents of Brooklyn had a high-school 
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education. The median level of educational attainment in Kings County was 8.5 years of 
schooling, a figure slightly lower than that for the other four boroughs of New York City.
69
  
Figures from the 1940 United States Census illustrate that Kaplan did not start his career 
at the most economically opportune moment. As Kaplan was embarking upon entrepreneurship, 
the rest of the United States was creaking out the Great Depression. Of New York City‟s 
6,102,747 residents in 1940 above the age of 14, only 3,474,760 were counted as members of the 
labor force.  In turn, only 2,839,366—or roughly 81.74 percent—of those residents in the labor 
force were actually employed. The figure augments to a slightly less grim 84.7 percent when one 
factors in those residents employed in “public emergency work.”
70
 Even if one attempted to 
mitigate the severity of the employment figures by focusing on those for men only, the results do 
not grow substantially. Of the 2,424,740 men in New York City‟s labor force in 1940 (out of 
2,989,576 men above age fourteen at the time), 1,964,346 were employed in non-emergency 
circumstances, a figure barely greater than 81 percent. Such figures were indicative of a broader, 
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 These labor figures are not mitigated unless the level of employment for the teenaged is 
taken into consideration. In 1940, there were 720,252 individuals aged fourteen to nineteen, of 
whom only 207,219 (or roughly 28.8 percent) were members of the labor force.  Of these 
207,219 young men and women, slightly more than 79 percent were eighteen or nineteen years 
of age.  Conversely, of the 233,658 males between fourteen and seventeen years of age in New 
York City in 1940, only 22,917 were in the labor force. Only 9,012 of these young men were 
actually employed at the time. 
72
 Overall, the 43,281 employable minors (those between ages 
fourteen and seventeen) comprised only 9.8 percent of all males and 8.7 of all females aged 14-
17 in the city that year.
73
  These figures are comparable to those for New York State in 1940. 
The 76,284 employable minors in the labor force that year comprised only 10 percent of all 
males and 7.5 percent of all females in this age group statewide.  
 Such figures indicate that Stanley Kaplan entered his tutoring business when those under 
eighteen years of age were more disinclined (or discouraged) to seek employment, a supposition 
which is strengthened when figures for employed minors of New York City and State in 1940 are 
compared to analogous figures for previous decades.  In 1930, roughly one-fifth of the state‟s 
841,331 youth aged fourteen to seventeen were in the labor force.  For New York City, the figure 
was closer to one-quarter; 110,552 of the city‟s 456,860 employable minors were in the labor 
force. The statistics for New York City in 1920 are even higher: 46 percent of all boys and 41.6 
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percent of all girls aged fourteen to seventeen were in the labor force.
74
 Stanley Kaplan came of 
age in New York City as increased emphasis was placed on secondary education, and entered 
into his business as broad economic factors forced many youth to delay entry into the labor 
force. Hence, Kaplan benefitted from a broader potential clientele for his tutoring business than 
previously possible. 
 Correspondingly, Kaplan‟s business began as an increasing proportion of older 
adolescents were staying in school. By 1930, an overwhelming majority of 14 and 15 year-old 
youth in Kings County were remaining in school. However, the idea that 16 and 17 year-olds 
would stay school did not become similarly commonplace until after 1940. (Even so, the rate of 
16 and 17 year-olds attending school significantly trailed that of their slightly younger adolescent 
counterparts.)
75
 Nonetheless, Kaplan began his tutoring business when an increased number of 
older adolescents were compelled or required to complete their secondary education. This trend 
continued as Kaplan began SAT test-coaching several years later. 
 But was Kaplan‟s decision to devise techniques for upwardly-mobile, mostly-white 
Brooklyn youth with discretionary family income to master the Scholastic Aptitude Test truly 
anomalous? Indeed, one can find scant evidence in New York Times advertisements from the 
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1930s and 1940s of individuals soliciting their coaching services for the College Board exams.
76
 
But none of these ads made any reference to the SAT itself, indicating that the aptitude test may 
not have been seen by many as a viable exam to coach, given that aptitude was viewed as a 
rather immutable facet of intelligence. Or, perhaps, the SAT was seen as a far less pressing 
concern to college hopefuls in comparison to other subject-based College Board entrance exams.  
 But, New York City and State‟s 1940 figures for educational workers suggest that 
Kaplan‟s business may have been part of a broader trend in educational entrepreneurship. 
(Kaplan did receive a Master‟s degree in education in 1940, but he never worked in a traditional 
school.
77
) According to the 1940 Census, 52,259 men and 93,190 women were employed as 
teachers of some sort in New York State. Unlike subsequent censuses, the figures only make 
distinctions for art teachers, college professors, and music teachers; the other 102,422 individuals 
are simply listed as “Teachers, n.e.c. [not elsewhere classified].”
78
 Unsurprisingly, the majority 
of teachers for the state, regardless of classification, resided in New York City. In 1940, the city 
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was home to 47,232 teachers without specific classification, 16,991 of whom residing in 
Brooklyn. More “n.e.c” teachers lived in Brooklyn than in any of the other four boroughs.
79
  
 Although the specification “n.e.c.” could merely refer to those working in a school 
system, i.e., primary and secondary school teachers, certain census figures for these teachers 
indicate that the classification may have been broader, thus including entrepreneurs such as 
Stanley Kaplan. The enumerated “n.e.c.” teachers in New York City in 1940 include instances of 
precocity, with two hundred sixty-six “n.e.c.” teachers were nineteen years of age or younger.
80
 
More telling are the income distribution levels for “n.e.c.” teachers in New York State. The 
broadest swath of teachers reported incomes for 1940 between $1,600 and $4,999 dollars, a 
range with as equivalent purchasing power as $24,934.63 to $77,905.13 in 2010 terms.
81
 
However, among all “n.e.c.” teachers in New York State, fully 19,528 reported incomes of less 
than $600; this would be equivalent to reporting an income of less than $9,350.49 in 2010.  
 Finally, the classification of education jobs in New York City by type was broad enough 
to merit Kaplan and his contemporaries‟ inclusion. The 1940 census lists 73,839 individuals in 
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New York City as working in “educational services.”
82
 Within this group, 50,110 are classified 
as “professional and semi-professional workers”; 608 as “proprietors, managers, and officials”; 
and 5,906 as “clerical, sales, and kindred workers.”
83
 While it would be foolish not to infer that a 
great deal of these professional categories do not fit within the public and private education 
apparatuses (e.g., principals and superintendants as “officials,” or secretaries and 
paraprofessionals as “clerical” workers), it would also be hasty to ignore the possibility that 
some of those who provided “educational services” did not necessarily work in primary or 
secondary education.  The evidence suggests that while Kaplan may have been an unusually 
early proponent of test-prep for the SAT, he was not the only person who found profit in 
education outside of the schoolhouse.  
The Transition From the College Board to Educational Testing Service 
 As Stanley Kaplan‟s SAT-coaching was becoming a popular option for students 
throughout Kings County and the New York City metropolitan area, the SAT was gaining 
additional custodial oversight. The history of the SAT as well as the transition of its development 
from the College Entrance Examination Board (or “College Board”) to Educational Testing 
Service (or “ETS”) in the late 1940‟s have been well-documented elsewhere, particularly by 
those in the standardized testing industry.
84
 Following World War Two, certain extra-
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governmental bodies felt that standardized testing no longer proved adequate in its current state. 
A 1946 investigative committee funded by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of 
Teaching, and headed by Harvard President J. B. Conant, determined that none of the extant 
organizations that developed and administered educational tests “[were] strong enough or well-
to-do enough to support the development of testing as it should be developed.”
85
  
 The committee‟s recommendation was simple: merge.  The new organization spawned 
from this merger, Educational Testing Service, would become the primary source for test 
research and development in American education and government. The agencies that did 
combine, most notably the College Board, were to retain figurehead statuses. Hence, Henry 
Chauncey and William Turnbull, who were appointed the top positions at ETS upon its 
inception, also maintained their respective executive positions at the College Board. Confusion 
arose over how these dual duties, which came without commensurate salaries, would be 
accorded full and proper attention. These men simplified the matter by resigning from their 
positions at the College Board in early 1948.   
 Fortunately, the thoughts of Henry Chauncey and other Education Testing Service 
officials are documented in ETS‟s Annual Report(s) to the Board of Trustees. Chauncey 
indicated in the first Annual Report that the initial research conducted by ETS would have three 
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foci: developing a broader catalog of aptitude tests; creating “measures of important aspects of 
personality”; and manufacturing tests which could easily make “observations of behavior.”
86
 
ETS did not exceed the ethical and operational boundaries its parent companies had set as it 
simply had the financial and infrastructural means to carry out precedent ambitions. If the SAT 
was initially regarded as a “psychological or intelligence test,” and if the first executives of ETS 
were originally from the College Board, then one may reason that subsequent versions of the 
SAT retained the original aims and intentions for the exam.
87
 
 Certain facets of the SAT, its initial years of oversight and development under ETS, and 
ETS itself ought to be discussed more thoroughly in order to illustrate how they fostered an 
environment conducive for the growth of the test-prep industry. One such facet is the structure of 
the SAT after the College Board ceded to ETS the task of developing the exam.  Compared to its 
initial two decades of existence, the Scholastic Aptitude Test had a far more stable format during 
its first two decades under Educational Testing Service‟s guardianship. Between 1948 and 1951, 
every version of the exam consisted of the same question types: antonym questions with six 
answer choices (reduced to five in 1952); analogy questions in which one must select the second 
pair of words; reading comprehension questions based off of passages; sentence completion 
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questions; and mathematical word problems with five answer choices. Save the addition of data 
sufficiency questions to the mathematical section in 1959, this combination of question types 
remained unchanged until 1969.
88
 
 Within this time period, however, the Scholastic Aptitude Test was, in the parlance of 
ETS, accorded reduced speededness. That is, students had relatively more time to spend per 
question. Just prior to ETS‟s acquisition of SAT development, a student was accorded an average 
of thirty-five seconds per verbal question, and sixty seconds per mathematics question. By the 
end of the 1960s, these figures rose to fifty and seventy-five seconds per question, respectively.
89
 
Students were not necessarily granted more time. Sixty fewer questions were asked on the 1969 
SAT than on the 1947 SAT, with only a ten minute reduction in overall exam duration. 
Nonetheless, the test‟s reduced speededness, consistent question formats, and stable scoring scale 
would provide favorable conditions for SAT-coaching. Aware that the format of the exam was 
not wildly volatile from year to year, test-prep entrepreneurs had an easier time developing 
preparatory material from the scant fragments of information ETS willingly divulged to the 
general public. 
 That said, one should also consider when and how Educational Testing Service had 
discussed test-prep in its early years of operation, particularly in regards to the SAT. The validity 
of intelligence and aptitude testing was called into question during the early 1950‟s when the 
English “Eleven-Plus” secondary school placement exams had been demonstrated to be highly 
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 In this sense, ETS was not immune from self-scrutiny. By its third year 
of operation, ETS had already expressed an interest in figuring out the Scholastic Aptitude Test‟s 
degree of coachability. The 1950-51 Annual Report notes that “Dr. Henry S. Dyer of Harvard” 
had begun working in collaboration with ETS in order to determine the SAT‟s susceptibility to 
focused instruction.
91
 The report stresses that such a study had the aim of protecting the 
“„consumers‟ of the tests.”
92
  
 Rather than consider the possible inherent flaws of aptitude testing, Chauncey remarked 
that “it [would be] manifestly undesirable to permit any applicant to gain an unwarranted 
advantage over others.”
93
 Hence, an aptitude test and its manufacturers were above reproach, 
while those who trained and were trained for better performances such tests were always 
culpable. More importantly, this statement indicates Chauncey‟s refusal to accept gains made in 
aptitude tests through coaching as genuine displays of aptitude. That is, there were no skills that 
one could accumulate through coaching that would be seen as verbal or quantitative aptitude.  
With this, Chauncey distinguished between teaching and coaching without truly defining either. 
 Given ETS‟ implied defense of its test-development practices and the SAT‟s structural 
integrity, one ought to also consider the importance of the SAT to ETS relative to other 
examinations created and administered by the agency. While the SAT retained its popularity 
after ETS took over the test‟s construction, it was not the preponderant component of the 
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nonprofit‟s initial operations. Between 1 January, 1948, and 30 June, 1949, 145,563 candidates 
sat for 303,064 College Board achievement and aptitude tests.
94
 However, the SAT candidates 
during ETS‟s first eighteen months of operations accounted for only 19 percent of all ETS 
examination candidates, and slightly more than 16 percent of all examinations scored.  
 The remaining candidates tested by ETS were not all collegiate hopefuls, nor were they 
all aiming for admission into graduate or professional school. ETS also used its psychometric 
know-how to develop series of exams for the United States Federal Government. The nonprofit‟s 
Annual Report for the 1949-50 fiscal year notes that ETS developed entrance exams for the 
United States Naval, Military, and Coast Guard Academies, as well as material for those seeking 
to enter foreign service.
95
 Two fiscal years later, the company developed selection tests for the 
Naval Reserve Officer Training Program and the United States Merchant Marine Cadet Corps; 
ETS also developed a “Mechanical Aptitude and Tool Relationships Test” for the Navy.
96
 
Perhaps most important was ETS‟s development of the Selective Service College Qualification 
Test during the 1950-1951 fiscal year. Chauncey remarked that this draft-deferment examination 
helped fulfill the “crucial need for optimal manpower utilization.”
97
 The American government 
needed ETS to fill roles in the sphere of defense, just as ETS needed the American government 
to give the company a sense of legitimacy. 
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 This codependence between the American federal government and Educational Testing 
Service, and ETS‟s clout and rapid growth in its early years of operation, may have stemmed 
from an initial lack of federal bureaucratic oversight. Prior to 1953, the United States Federal 
Government lacked a Cabinet-level officer who dealt with education. Although the government 
had a Commissioner of Education under the Federal Security Agency, this position lacked the 
guarantee of sustained direct contact with the president. This lack of executive oversight changed 
when President Eisenhower used the Reorganization Act of 1949 in order to create the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) in early 1953.
98
 Eisenhower‟s rationale 
for the creation of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare indicates that the president 
sought a slimmer, more thrift-minded executive bureaucracy.
99
 Hence, any business or 
organization that could provide services particular to one of the three components of HEW may 
have been regarded favorably.  However, the gap in time between the creation of ETS and the 
establishment of HEW may have allowed the nonprofit agency greater leeway in its overarching 
endeavors once bureaucratic infrastructure was finally created several years later. 
 Thirdly, one must consider how ETS interacted with the business world during its early 
years, and how standardized tests factored into this interaction. From its inception, ETS sought to 
integrate corporate philanthropy with educational assessment. One early example was the 
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aborted Pepsi-Cola Scholarship program. Although “lack of funds” cut this program short, the 
Pepsi-Cola Scholarship Program sought to provide 120 students with “four-year scholarships 
covering nearly all of their college expenses,” an unprecedented level of direct corporate 
educational philanthropy.
100
 Novelty aside, the failed endeavor set the precedent for corporations 
cooperating with ETS in order to create scholarship programs. During the 1950-51 fiscal year, 
ETS secured a partnership with Ford Motor Company. Ford used SAT scores as part of its 
process in selecting seventy children of Ford employees to receive full college scholarships.
101
 
More salient was the implication of such massive programs: business shall reward you for your 
natural talents. In turn, these early programs, which would lead to the National Merit Scholarship 
Program, allowed space for business to openly and acceptably interact with education through 
standardized testing. 
 Finally, both ETS and certain elements of the test-prep industry shared a fascination for 
emerging media and their pedagogical potential. Beginning with the 1951-1952 Annual Report, 
Chauncey began a several-year campaign to revolutionize elementary and secondary education 
(particularly science, English, and mathematics) through novel media. He opined: 
(…) it is very doubtful that even the most capable elementary teacher can do as 
uniformly good a job—from day to day and from one subject-matter area to 
another—as can be done by a series of expertly-prepared instructional films.
102
 
 Bound to this sentiment was Chauncey‟s fascination with the emerging medium of 
television. In the 1952-53 Annual Report, Chauncey explains that educational television 
programs could become a vital asset in primary and secondary schooling, but that the new 
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technology required the support of scientists and other specialists who would be willing to 
produce series of educational programming. Chauncey justified his opinions by equating the 
potential benefits of educational television to those already seen with educational film. The 
executive remarked that “suitable instructional films are more effective than poor instructors and 
at least as effective as the average instructor,” and television, if harnessed properly, should be no 
different.
103
 In subsequent years, Chauncey would marvel over the use of closed-circuit and 
open-circuit educational television programs being conducted in cities and school systems across 
the country. With television, a teacher would not become redundant, but rather somehow serve 
as a “constructing architect.”
104
 The ineffable quintessence of teaching could be better used to 
guide much larger students to success along standardized lines. 
 Just as ETS took a liking to the latest in technology, Stanley Kaplan consistently 
incorporated new technology and media into his test-preparation programs in order to increase 
students‟ performances on standardized exams. Kaplan‟s “long-term relationship with the tape 
recorder,” began in the late 1940s, when he began to record sessions with clients on a Sound 
Mirror tape recorder.
105
 Students could then come back to Kaplan‟s office prior to their next 
session in order to review material already covered. Kaplan would segue his early adoption of 
tape recording to create a series of taped material called “Test-N-Tapes,” and these “topical 
review tapes” would become a mainstay of his company.
106
 By offering students an array of 
taped review and auxiliary material, the company presented the image of customization for its 
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clientele. While clients only had a certain number of Test-N-Tapes at their disposal, the sheer 
quantity was great enough to compel students to focus more strategically on particular concepts 
and topics, hence giving customers the feeling that their test-prep was equally comprehensive 
and suited to their needs. 
Scoping the Competition  
 However useful Kaplan‟s series of tapes may have been or seemed for its clients, the 
study aid in itself does not explain how the company attracted its customers. In general, the novel 
methods and media used by test-prep companies to coach their clientele do not inherently explain 
how these companies sparked consumer interest nor how they portrayed their services as 
legitimate and beneficial. In order to understand how early test-prep companies cultivated 
consumer bases, fashioned self-images, and portrayed their products, it is necessary to analyze 
these companies‟ print advertisements from the mid-twentieth century.  
 Doing so first requires a little grounding in advertising theory, particularly the works of 
Judith Williamson and Roland Barthes. Williamson contends that advertising is a form of 
communication, unbridled from any particular medium, that “sells us the idea that we are „free‟ 
to „choose‟ between things.”
107
 That is, advertising allows its audience to believe that 
consumption is a matter of genuine personal desire—and that these purchases are a genuine 
reflection of social standing. Further, by “transforming the language of objects to that of people, 
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and vice versa,” advertising gives consumers the ability to connect who they are (and will be) 
with what they purchase.
108
 
 Meanwhile, the theorist Roland Barthes considers advertisements through a linguistic 
frame. In the essay “Rhetoric of the Image,” Barthes deconstructs a French pasta print 
advertisement in order to contend that these commercial “images […] produce true systems of 
signs and not merely simple agglutinations of symbols.”
109
 That is, the imagery found in 
advertisements does not directly relate to reality, but creates an evocative self-contained 
depiction of reality. This imagery is parallel to what is real, but also remains within its own self-
contained world. One is addressed as a reader and as a consumer as an ad speaks to both one‟s 
senses and one‟s wishes.
110
 However, if advertisements address individuals‟ multiple senses of 
self, then the actual message of an advertisement may go beyond the simple plea to buy a certain 
product. Indeed, Barthes asserts that advertisements convey to the reader “three messages: a 
linguistic message, a coded iconic message, and a non-coded iconic message.”
111
   
 In this sense, advertisements for test-prep companies tapped into Barthes‟s notion of 
multiple coding and Williamson‟s belief in the illusion of choice. Further, test-prep companies 
shared a common coded language in their advertising. Herein lies the leap: Within these ads, the 
phrases “SAT,” “Scholastic Aptitude Test,” and “College Boards” were used as connotative 
images rather than just terms for the exam for which the company offered preparatory services. 
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That is, references to the SAT in test-prep companies‟ ads were partially disassociated from the 
actual process of taking the SAT in order to create the allure of test-prep. By viewing these 
phrases and other imagery in test-prep companies‟ ads, student-consumers and their parents were 
not forced to face the stark reality of college-entrance aptitude tests, but rather were drawn into 
the fantasy of life with a college degree. 
  Given the chapter‟s opening, one might presume that Stanley H. Kaplan Educational 
Centers would be the most reasonable company with which to begin an analysis of test-prep 
adverts. However, there is one considerable caveat, as the company eschewed direct advertising 
until the late 1960s. Stanley Kaplan found print advertising distasteful, and claimed that most of 
his company‟s early business was gained through word-of-mouth notoriety. The decision to 
advertise after three decades of entrepreneurship was largely reactionary: 
Other professionals such as doctors and lawyers were now advertising. And my 
competitors, while still smaller than Kaplan, were now advertising. […] Every 
Sunday we placed an ad in the education section of The New York Times because 
it gave us credibility in the serious academic world.
112
 
So, if other test-prep companies in New York City were advertising years before Kaplan, then it 
would be sensible to first discuss those competitors‟ print advertisements, in particular those 
placed in the New York Times during the 1950s and 1960s.  Doing so will establish precedence 
for test-prep advertising, as well as clarify what may have made Kaplan‟s advertising distinct 
from its competition. 
 Perhaps the most notorious test-prep instructors, and Kaplan‟s biggest direct competition, 
in New York City during the 1950s and 1960s were Samuel C. Brownstein and Mitchel Weiner. 
Stanley Kaplan had become acquainted with the pair through his work as an editor for Manny 
                                                        
112
 Kaplan, Test Pilot, 82. 
 47 
Barron, namesake of the Barron‟s publishing company. Weiner and Brownstein had collaborated 
to write the landmark test-prep guide Barron’s How to Prepare for College Entrance 
Examinations.
113
 The duo offered SAT-prep classes through the business College Entrance 
Tutoring Service. This company‟s ads routinely appeared in the Times‟ education section in the 
late 1950s and early 1960s, and never failed to tout Brownstein and Wiener‟s writing credentials. 
Although the business was located at 1813 East 26
th
 Street in south-central Brooklyn, 
Brownstein and Weiner routinely held weekend morning classes “at the Statler Hilton” Hotel in 
Manhattan.
114
  Classes were also held on weekday nights in the boroughs of Queens and 
Brooklyn. These 30-hour courses were originally advertised for the price of fifty dollars, but by 
1964, the fee had risen to sixty dollars.  
 When adjusted for inflation, the $60 price for the Brownstein-Weiner prep course would 
be equivalent to roughly $420 in 2010.
115
 Less anachronistically, the price was less than one 
percent of the median income of $6,569 for American families in 1964, and about four-fifths of 
one percent of the $7230 median income that year for families in the Northeast.
116
 On the 
surface, such relative affordability was reflective of the “substantial increase in real purchasing 
                                                        
113
 Kaplan, Test Pilot, 44. 
114
 ―Classified Ad 95,‖ New York Times, August 26, 1962; 156;  ―Display Ad 173,‖ New York Times, 
September 27, 1964: E9. For more examples of ads for Brownstein and Weiner‘s services, please see:  ―Classified 
Ad 80,‖ New York Times, September 1, 1957: 104; ―Display Ad 185,‖ New York Times, January 11, 1959: E8; 
―Display Ad 159,‖ New York Times, January 18, 1959: E11; ―Display Ad 188,‖ New York Times, March 6, 1960: 
E8; and ―Display Ad 120,‖ New York Times, September 4, 1960: 124. All ads cited in this note can be found and are 
catalogued as such in ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times, 
http://search.proquest.com/1005701/advanced?accountid=10003&language=En (accessed February 1, 2001). 
115
 ―CPI Inflation Calculator,‖ in ―Databases &Tools,‖ Bureau of Labor Statistics website, 
http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (last accessed March 14, 2011). 
 
116
 United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-
60, no. 47: Income in 1964 of Families and Persons in the United States (Washington D.C.: United States 
Government Printing Office, 1965), 4, 5. New York State is placed by the U.S. Bureau of the Census in the Middle 
Atlantic division of the Northeast; please see ―Census Regions and Divisions of the United States,‖ U.S. Census 
Bureau Website, http://www.census.gov/geo/www/us_regdiv.pdf (accessed January 30, 2011). 
 48 
power” for Americans between 1947 and 1964.
117
  Incomes during this period consistently 
outpaced the rate of inflation. 
 But, stark disparities emerge when accounting for race and education. Although the 
median nonwhite family income jumped 11 percent between 1963 and 1964, this figure—
$3839—was only 56 percent of the median white income for that year.
118
 The Brownstein-
Weiner course would have thus been one-and one-half percent of the median American nonwhite 
family income. Conversely, families “headed by college graduates” had a median income of 
$10,600 in 1964, thus earning on average 47 percent more than those families headed by high 
school graduates, and double of those families led by workers without high school diplomas.
119
  
By printing the price of its test-prep course, College Entrance Tutoring Service knowingly 
advertised to an audience for whom $60 would have been a relatively trivial fee, and for whom 
Brownstein and Weiner‟s book would have been regarded as an inferior alternative.  
 Certain preparatory schools also placed advertisements in the New York Times’ Education 
section. These schools, such as Sadie Brown‟s Collegiate Institute, offered general education 
courses with credits one could assumedly apply to certain other colleges in the metropolitan area. 
As seen in an ad from 1 June, 1969, Sadie Brown‟s Collegiate Institute also provided the 
“educational extra[ of p]reparation for the Scholastic Aptitude Test.”
120
 An advertisement 
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specifically geared for Sadie Brown‟s Collegiate Institute SAT prep class was printed in the 
Times nearly six months later. While the ad omits pricing information, it insists that the course, 
which was scheduled to meet for ten Saturday mornings from January to March, 1970, would be 
taught by “outstanding instructors [using] new teaching techniques.”
121
  
 Meanwhile, the Gilbert School, a day school located at 341 Bridge Street in northeast 
Brooklyn, also courted students through the promise of SAT prep in its Times advertisement. The 
school‟s ad asserted that “Preparation for [the] College Entrance Board Examination is Part of 
[Gilbert‟s] High School Program”; a rigorous curriculum alone could no longer be seen as the 
guarantor of a strong SAT score.
122
 Similarly, the Rhodes School of 11 West 54
th
 Street, 
Manhattan, frequently advertised its SAT-prep courses, while nearly-identical courses were 
offered by The Highland School of Jamaica Estates, Queens. For fifty dollars, a student was able 




 While the vast majority of test-prep company‟s ads used unmemorable imagery, some 
used provocative ad copy, most notably the advertisements for College Skills Center of 1234 
Broadway, Manhattan. The company offered courses not only in the city proper, but also in 
Great Neck and White Plains, two New York inner suburbs. Under the direction of Jack 
Yourman and Allan Sack, the proprietary school had a ten-week course in “basic study [and] 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2007), 
http://search.proquest.com/1005701/advanced?accountid=10003&language=En (accessed February 1, 2001). 
121
 ―Display Ad 153,‖ New York Times, November 30, 1969; E10. 
122
 ―Display Ad 173,‖ New York Times, September 27, 1964: E9. 
123
 ―Display Ad 185,‖ New York Times, January 11, 1959; E8; ―Display Ad 159,‖ New York Times, January 
18, 1959: E11. See also: ―Display Ad 185,‖ New York Times, February 14, 1960: E6; and ―Display Ad 188,‖ New 




 The preparatory services offered were not directly related to the actual material 
on the examination. The copy from a Times ad for the company stressed how crucial such 
preparation is: 
The crucial Scholastic Aptitude Test is not a test of achievement. […] It is a test 
of ability to reason from facts given. It is a thinking-power test, against time. […] 
But how prepare? [sic] Cramming won‟t help; coaching with pat answers won‟t. 




 In turn, bookstores also used provocative copy in their advertisements when selling test-
prep material. Aldine Book Shop of White Plains, New York, purchased ad space in the Times in 
order to promote its collection of Barron‟s preparatory guides. Before listing the store‟s holdings, 
which included Brownstein and Weiner‟s College Boards prep guides, the ad copy attempted to 
goad those students who may have held disdain toward standardized testing. The copy posited, 
“Ever wonder why some students, even poorer ones, manage to get the breaks?”
126
 By 
acknowledging that college entrance exams may not truly measure a student‟s actual capabilities, 
the ad was better able to sell the Barron‟s line of test guides. For less than four dollars (with 
twenty cents for shipping), a student could purchase such titles as Barron’s How to Prepare for 
the PSAT, How to Prepare for College Entrance Examinations, Barron’s Vocabulary Builder, 
and You Can Win a Scholarship. In turn, the student-consumer was left feeling that these books, 
“concisely written by men who have spent their lives counseling and teaching,” would truly fix 
the injustice of standardized tests.
127
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 Barron‟s itself also used provocative language to push its own line of publications. The 
hook for one of Barron‟s New York Times ads asked, “Can an average high-school senior find 
happiness as a college freshman?”
128
 The inferred answer is simple: Yes, so long as said senior 
mailed several dollars to Barron‟s book repository in Woodbury, Long Island, in exchange for 
several prep books. Other publishing houses relied on bravado rather than provocation. Arco 
Publishing Company, headquartered at 480 Lexington Avenue, Manhattan, asserted in one ad for 
the Times that its “pre-eminence in Civil Service and Educational Preparation Books [had] never 
been seriously challenged.”
129
 For less than a dollar, a student could purchase Arco‟s Practice 
for Scholastic Aptitude Tests and use the 2000 questions within the prep-book alleged to improve 
one‟s performance on the exam. 
 This element of frugality went beyond those test-prep advertisements just shilling books. 
One 1966 Times ad pushed Key Facts, a series of prepackaged flashcards for SAT preparation. 
For seventy-five cents (eighty-five if ordered by mail from Dell Distributing, Inc.), a student 
could “test himself […using] actual questions from past exams.”
130
 How these past math and 
verbal SAT questions were acquired was not specified. Some proprietary prep schools offered 
lecture series on SAT prep for lower prices than their SAT prep courses. For only twenty-five 
dollars, both of a child‟s parents would receive admission to Student Skills Center‟s “College 
Clinic,” where they would listen to a guest speaker from the College Board.
131
 Customers had 
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their choice of attending the series at either Topsy‟s Restaurant in Forest Hills, Queens, or 
Cooky‟s Restaurant in Hempstead, Long Island.  
 Those who had a bit more money to devote to test prep, but also held reservations toward 
attending lecture series in a restaurant, still had an option with the Honor Scholastic 
Development Course. For $39.95 (comparable to spending $285 in 2010), parents could 
purchase an Honor Push-Button Teaching Machine for their college hopeful. Using “the latest 
educational method[…of] programmed instruction,” the device used a series of scrolls designed 
to provide SAT prep through self-paced study.
132
 By merely pushing buttons, a student could 
allegedly improve his study skills as well as augment his verbal and mathematical capabilities.  
 The above pages were not designed to be a catalogue of tedium, but rather an illustration 
of those proprietary schools and other test-prep business that advertised in the New York Times 
prior to Kaplan. The advertisements not only demonstrate that the test-prep market had become a 
multifaceted and highly competitive arena by the late sixties, but also illustrate the growing open 
acceptance of such preparatory measures.  In turn, the pricing in these advertisements shows that 
the idea of SAT prep was not necessarily confined to certain socioeconomic lines. This is not to 
say that those teenagers who could only afford to prepare for the exam by purchasing a book 
from Barron‟s or Arco, or running to the corner store to buy a packet of Key Facts, had an 
equitable opportunity to those youth who attended a Brownstein-Weiner or College Skills Center 
course. However, the opportunity to prepare, as cordoned by one‟s socioeconomic status, 
allowed the feeling that they were in greater control of their own destiny. For a negotiable price, 
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the SAT could become a more and more familiar beast. After a peculiar start, Kaplan would 
capitalize upon selling this sentiment of familiarization in its own advertising. 
Selling Dream Insurance 
 It seems that Kaplan‟s first appearance in the New York Times’ education section had the 
company aligned with the provocative style of its competitors. In a series of nineteen ads that ran 
in the Times between September, 1967, and February, 1968, The National Scholastic Aptitude 
Training Institute (“NSATI”) promoted its SAT prep courses. The ads indicate a degree of 
collaboration between NSATI and Kaplan. The “hook,” printed in capitalized, bolded, sans-serif 
font, was designed to shock readers: “82% OF ALL APPLICANTS ARE DENIED 
ADMISSION TO THE COLLEGES OF THEIR INITIAL CHOICE!”
133
 Beneath this hook lies a 
black-and-white picture of students checking in for the SAT. Below this, a guilt-laden plea: 
“Since those without a college education face a limited potential, don‟t you really owe it to your 
son or daughter to provide the very best preparation for the forthcoming College Board 
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 The message was melodramatic but clear, implying that the children in the 
photo, and the reader‟s own children, may be embarking upon years of disappointment should 
they perform poorly on the SAT. 
 Upon first glance, the ads seem to show oddly little interaction between NSATI and 
Kaplan. NSATI offered demonstrations and SAT prep courses in all boroughs and New York 
City metropolitan areas except Brooklyn. Interested parties living in Kings County were directed 
to visit Kaplan‟s office at 1675 East 16
th
 Street. This could be mistakenly interpreted as 
territorial respect, that NSATI referred interested Brooklynites to Kaplan in order to secure 
market preponderance elsewhere in a clean quid-pro-quo. Yet, in the middle of the ads‟ copy, the 
company reassured readers that all of its SAT coaches used the “renowned Stanley H. Kaplan 
curriculum that has shown proven results for 20 years for more than 25,000 graduates.”
135
 While 
this ad copy helps show how much influence Kaplan had in SAT prep in New York City up to 
that point, it does not clear up the level of interaction and similarity between the two companies.  
 What further muddled the relationship between Kaplan and National Scholastic Aptitude 
Training Institute was a Times ad from 25 June, 1967. The classified did not cater to students or 
their parents, but rather hopeful entrepreneurs. Touting “the most exciting franchise offer in 
years,” the ad solicited the opportunity to become a NSATI franchisee in a major metropolitan 
area.
136
 A franchisee need not even be an educator in order to run an NSATI branch. Although 
the advertisement did not indicate that the company (based in Hackensack, New Jersey) relied on 
Kaplan‟s techniques, franchising of any sort ran counter to Kaplan‟s method of expansion during 
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the late 1960s and early 1970s. Kaplan instead hired independent contractors to run his 
business‟s branches “because [he] wanted complete control over the quality of the courses.”
137
 
What arises is a kink in Kaplan‟s tale. An entrepreneur staunchly opposed to opening his own 
business to franchising granted a different franchise-oriented company the right to use, at the 
very least, his own reputation.  
  Stanley H. Kaplan Educational Center‟s first independent advertisements were far less 
bombastic than those for NSATI. The first one for the New York Times appears to have been in 
the 24 August, 1969, edition of the paper, at the bottom center of the Education section‟s 
advertisement page. Rather than goad or shock, the ad‟s hook was a simple imperative statement: 
“ENROLL NOW for SAT Preparation at the STANLEY H. KAPLAN EDUCATIONAL 
CENTER.”
138
 Though the ad was small, its text was spare and easily grasped, and compared to 
other educational ads on the page, it was nearly minimalist. The ad‟s tail, “Tutoring and 
Guidance Since 1938,” attempts to instill a sense of legitimacy through longevity. Surely a 
company that had business for thirty years could be trusted to provide credible services.
139
 The 
Kaplan logo, an owl perched atop an open book, was the only image in the ad. (This insignia was 
created by an agency specifically for advertisements.
140
) By using a logo with no overt 
references to standardized tests, and instead relying on the owl and book as symbolic references 
to knowledge and education, Kaplan was able to distance itself from the immediate purpose of its 
business and place it within a broader context of education.  
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 Some of Kaplan‟s ads, such as the one placed in the Times on 24 January, 1970, were far 
more ornate. Its hook, “Dream Insurance,” was typeset in all-caps black sans-serif font, and 
placed over an impressionistic ink drawing of two faces peering through a lilting path toward a 
majestic sunlit horizon.
141
 The ad copy began by asserting, “Dreams, yes…delusions, no!” Yet, 
the ad also played upon ambiguity. For example, the ad stressed that SAT scores were not the 
primary factor in admissions, yet then remarked that poor SAT scores would likely warrant 
rejection. The ad detailed Stanley Kaplan‟s innovative instructional approach, included an 
endorsement from Seventeen magazine, and even mused that students traveled cross-country to 
attend a Kaplan course—but then stated that the company made “no empty promises, no absolute 
guarantees.”
142
 To this end, the company fueled its aura of “dream insurance” by daring the 
reader not to consider test-prep. If “[a] college education can help [one‟s] dreams come true,” 
and college admission hinged on decent-enough SAT scores, then one would have been foolish 
not to secure the only unsound link between high school and college through a Kaplan course.
143
 
 But, Kaplan did not focus all of its advertising energy toward the Times. As seen by 
Kaplan‟s advertising in The Barnard Bulletin, the company also courted those who lived near the 
company‟s flagship office. Barnard, a women‟s college in Manhattan, frequently ran 
advertisements for Kaplan in its college newspaper during the early 1970s. Given the readership 
demographics for the Bulletin, Kaplan tailored its advertisements to promote its test-prep 
services for post-baccalaureate entrance exams. Some ads, such as one published in the Bulletin 
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on 20 September, 1973, touted that a client‟s “[l]esson schedule [could] be tailored to meet 
individual needs,” with prep courses ranging in duration from one week to one year.
144
 The ad 
also emphasized “Special Compact Courses during Weekends,” perhaps to attract clientele who 
are generally consumed with schoolwork or work during the week.
145
 The word “special” 
designated that one was not forced to accommodate prep into their life, but rather that Kaplan 
had keenly found a way to provide thorough test prep amidst a busy schedule. 
 Kaplan soon expanded its advertising to smaller publications in the New England and 
Middle States regions, particularly in college papers. Between 1971 and 1974, Stanley H. Kaplan 
Educational Center placed no fewer than forty-four advertisements in The Cornell Daily Sun. 
The weekday publication was the official paper for Cornell University of Ithaca, New York, a 
town that lacked an actual Stanley H. Kaplan Educational Center during this spate of advertising. 
The earliest among these ads, printed between 4 February and 11 May, 1971, employed a simple, 
but evocative hook: “Your Future Awaits the Test.”
146
 That fall, after the newspaper‟s summer 
hiatus, the hook was replaced with a marquee of various standardized tests. Rather than lure a 
customer in with a catchy saying, the company thought it would be more attractive to display all 
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of the tests for which the company offered preparation. This is not to say that these 
advertisements were mere blocks of unappealing text. Rather, the company constantly employed 
insignias in each of their ads in order to convey a sense of credibility with the viewer. Every 
Kaplan ad printed in the Sun during this three-year stretch ended with the motto “The Tutoring 
School with the Nationwide Reputation.”
147
 By using the term “tutoring school,” the company 
was able to distance itself from less reputable proprietary institutions and coaching schools. 
 The ads found in the Sun also illustrate Kaplan‟s quick rate of expansion. The company‟s 
first advertisement in the paper noted that Stanley H. Kaplan Educational Center, Ltd. had 
offices “in Boston[,] Philadelphia[,] Washington[, and] Detroit.”
148
 Seven months later, this list 
grew, listing Los Angeles and Miami as locations where Kaplan operated.
149
 A year after that, 
the ads began to state that the company held “Branches in Major Cities in [the] U.S.A.”
150
 In less 
than two years, the company had expanded at such a rate that listing all of its major-city 
locations in a small ad would have been unreasonable.  
 Kaplan‟s pattern of printing advertisements in cities far from its actual centers is also 
illustrated in the archives of The Columbia Missourian. In a thirteen-month period between 
September 1974, and October 1975, the company placed forty-six advertisements in the 
Missourian. Yet, the closest city to Columbia in which Kaplan offered classes was St. Louis, 
over one hundred miles to the east of Columbia. Further, the first four months of advertisements 
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do not list a Missouri phone number that one could call for information. Interested readers had to 
contact the center at “2050 W. Devon, [in] Chicago,” some several hours to the northeast.
151
 
Kaplan‟s ads for the Missourian all follow the same basic template. Similar to those found in the 
Cornell Daily Sun, the ads in the Missourian displayed a marquee of standardized tests and their 
respective dates of administration. A thick black triangular border reminiscent of a quilted edge 
framed these ads. This sentiment was heightened when extra detailing was added to the border‟s 
corners beginning in January 1975. This set of advertisements attracted readers through the same 
earnest but highly vague hook: “There is a difference!!!”
152
 
 Despite this evidence of Kaplan‟s growth, one would be hasty to claim that the test-prep 
industry existed solely within the New York City metropolitan area until Stanley Kaplan decided 
to expand his operations. As seen with the advertisements placed in the Pittsburgh publications 
The Jewish Chronicle and The Jewish Criterion, the industry bloomed in other areas independent 
of Kaplan‟s presence. The Pittsburgh Teachers Tutoring Service, located at 122 South Whitfield 
Street, advertised in the Criterion in 1959 that it offered “group instruction [for the] college 
boards.”
153
 In turn, Pittsburgh‟s Point Park Junior College placed advertisements in the 
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Chronicle for “summer reading and study courses” geared partially toward improved 
performance on the College Board exams.
154
  
 The listings continue. College Skills Center, housed within Pittsburgh‟s Clark Building, 
advertised its test-prep services in the Chronicle. Students were advised to cut out and mail in a 
slip in order to receive information on how College Skills Center‟s courses could help one 
“[a]ttain complete readiness for [one‟s] College Boards.”
155
 The Pittsburgh Academy of 836 
Fourth Street also implored interested readers to request information through a coupon. The 
company advertised that it offered a “[c]oncentrated program in English, vocabulary, [and] 
mathematics” for students preparing for the SAT.
156
 Meanwhile, The Laboratory School, located 
within Pittsburgh‟s Maxon Towers, touted its College Boards Prep in an ad for the Chronicle; 
students would improve through “technologically implemented student learning.”
157
 Tedium 
aside, the point is clear as all of these businesses operated and advertised in Pittsburgh prior to 
Kaplan, Ltd.‟s expansion into the area.  
 However, these advertisements do illustrate a crucial difference between Pittsburgh‟s 
original test prep companies and Kaplan, Ltd.  Whereas Kaplan provided standardized test 
preparation geared toward the particular exam that a customer had planned on taking, 
Pittsburgh‟s original test prep companies typically offered preparatory services broad enough to 
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be applied to areas outside of standardized testing. Point Park Junior College‟s preparatory 
course was primarily a speed-reading course, with emphasis placed on vocabulary skills and 
study habits. The Laboratory School, which held a license from the Pennsylvania “State Board of 
Private Academic Schools,” also focused on building students‟ skills in communication.
158
 
Meanwhile, The Pittsburgh Academy and The Pittsburgh Teachers Tutoring Service both offered 
tutoring in all subject areas, particularly for remedial instruction. Although the College Skills 
Center was the most adamant among these companies in advertising its test prep services, the 
company was primarily geared toward courses in general skills that would prove useful once one 
entered college; it was just as wont to advertise to adolescents as to adults.  
 While the test prep industry began to alter its style of direct advertisement, the College 
Board was itself using print media to advertise certain services to college admissions officers. As 
seen with an ad found in a late 1973 issue of College Board Review, the agency sought to gain 
clientele for its Student Search Service. For only “7¢ a name [and a] basic participation fee [of] 
$100,” colleges that were members of the College Board could request mailing information for 
high school juniors and seniors who fit certain economic, academic, or ethnic characteristics.
159
 
For example, with an initial payment of $200, a college affiliated with the Board could 
participate in Student Search Service and receive contact information for 1,428 high school 
students who possessed desired criteria, and an initial $1000 could buy information on 12,857 
students. Such information would be delivered “on mailing labels, on punched cards, or on 
magnetic tape.”
160
 To reinforce the notion of encouraging the manufacture of collegiate diversity, 
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the ad‟s copy contours around a sketch of a multicultural assortment of youth. The only direct 
connection to academics is the sketch of a presumably-white male clutching a slide-rule in the 
drawing‟s foreground.  In a sense, the CEEB sought to sell “dream insurance” to its own 
members; for a reasonable processing fee, and considerable faith in the SAT, any college could 
use the Student Search Service to solicit and craft the ideal entering class. 
Conclusion 
 Clearly, the operational legitimacy of the test-prep industry depends upon the presence of 
standardized testing. As seen through Educational Testing Service‟s first decade of Annual 
Reports, however, the presence of standardized testing was itself insufficient cause to spark the 
test-prep industry‟s growth. Rather, the rapid prevalence of standardized testing, largely under 
the auspices of ETS, created an environment suitable for test-prep companies to flourish. In turn, 
ETS‟s foray into corporate-sponsored scholarships provided a precedent for accepted direct 
interaction between higher education, business, and adolescence. Educational Testing Service‟s 
fascination with new technology and emerging media was correspondent with the test-prep 
industry‟s use of technology and media in its own services. 
Meanwhile, the test-prep industry, particularly in New York City, benefitted from a 
demographic shift. Fewer adolescents were leaving secondary school before graduating, and 
fewer employable minors were active in the work force. Although the test-prep industry may 
have relied more heavily on indirect and word-of-mouth advertising than on direct print 
advertising, the very presence of print advertisements for test companies in the early years of the 
industry provided a foundation for that industry‟s accumulation of legitimacy. Simply put, direct 
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advertising took test-prep companies from clandestine operations to openly acknowledged 
businesses. Kaplan, the most notable of the test prep companies, used evocative imagery and 
language to distinguish itself from its competitors. Once Kaplan began to expand its operations 
beyond the New York City metropolitan area, the company was quick to advertise its services. 
However, some advertising decisions defy common sense unless placed in the context of 
adamant rapid expansion. In turn, viewing publications from other major urban areas, notably 
Pittsburgh, demonstrates that test-prep, particularly for the SAT, was not endemic to New York 
City prior to Kaplan and other test-prep companies‟ expansion outside of that metropolitan area. 
If Kaplan‟s ads kept mum on pricing, it was because these adverts were designed to cater 
to two distinct sets of consumers: those who were savvy on private tutoring and test-coaching, 
and were well-aware of its cost; and those who desired to change their social status through post-
secondary education, were aware of the existent customer base with disposable income, but may 
have been disillusioned or discouraged if presented with the cost of a prep course—or more 
metaphorically, the “hurdle” between their current state and their ambitions. 
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CHAPTER TWO: LEGITIMACY BY DEFAULT: THE TEST-PREP 
INDUSTRY’S ACQUISITION OF ACCEPTIBILITY, 1962-1979 
 
“How well do the S.A.T.‟s perform their intended function of predicting college 
grades? It depends on the college, but on the whole, in the purely statistical sense, 
they do so no better than a man‟s weight indicates his height.” 




 In 1965, the debate over test-coaching seemed to be settled. At least, the College Board 
seemed to believe so when it published Effects of Coaching on Scholastic Aptitude Test Scores. 
Intended for “secondary school administrators, teachers, and counselors,” the booklet was 
designed to inform readers over the preponderant scientific evidence against test-coaching.
162
  To 
the dismay of all who believed that SAT scores could be augmented with concerted effort, the 
College Board‟s pamphlet contained the results of seven studies that proved otherwise: coaching 
could never raise SAT scores beyond statistically insignificant levels.  
 Indeed, the booklet was as much a dismissal of test-coaching as it was an open query on 
why SAT coaching had grown without any proof of its effectiveness. The memorandum included 
with the booklet—written by College Board President Richard Pearson—was no less adamant 
about what was to blame for the growth of test-coaching, namely anything but the College 
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 As far the College Board was concerned, the organization itself could not be blamed 
for the rise of test-coaching (despite test-coaching‟s operational dependence upon the structure of 
standardized testing), but it was obliged to prevent hardworking students and concerned parents 
from committing the grievous sin of purchasing an SAT prep course.  
 Yet, Effects of Coaching on Scholastic Aptitude Test Scores ultimately did not settle any 
debates over the legitimacy or ethicality of test-coaching. Between the early 1960s and late 
1970s, the American educational system at-large underwent several crucial alterations. Some—
such as the Federal Trade Commission‟s investigation of Stanley H. Kaplan Educational Centers, 
as well as New York State‟s Truth-in-Testing legislation—had a direct and obvious bearing on 
the test prep industry. Others, such as the creation of the Department of Education, the advent of 
performance contracting, and the Supreme Court Case Lemon v. Kurtzman, had an indirect but 
no less important role in establishing the legal, ethical, and pedagogical boundaries of the 
legitimacy of the test-prep industry. Ironically, by the end of the 1970s, the test-prep industry 
attained legitimacy by default. The shifts in American education during the preceding two 
decades had made the industry largely acceptable because it was not wholly unacceptable. In 
order to describe these shifts, the official position of the College Board toward coaching at the 
beginning of this period should be further discussed. 
The College Board and Its Discontent  
 Another glance at Effects of Coaching on Scholastic Aptitude Test Scores will better 
illustrate the rhetoric used by the College Board in its opposition to test-coaching. The authors of 
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the pamphlet repeatedly denied the culpability of the College Board in fostering an educational 
environment prone to SAT prep. Rather, the media was deemed responsible for accepting 
advertisements from coaching schools, while parents were charged with being too ignorant when 
demanding that educators should reprioritize their efforts. Principals and superintendents were 
faulted for acquiescing to parents‟ demands for SAT review, and test coaches were labeled as 
foolish for thinking that their SAT prep produced genuine results. The organization‟s trustees 
went so far as to downplay the actual importance of the SAT in their official statement. If the 
SAT was “merely supplementary to the school record” in a student‟s college application, then 
high-schoolers ought to give little worry over the outcome of their SAT scores.
164
  
 Crucial to the College Board‟s argument was its clever definition of two key terms: 
“coaching” and “aptitude.”  The writers of the booklet defined coaching as “a variety of methods 
used in attempting to increase in a relatively short time students‟ mastery of the particular skills, 
concepts, and reasoning abilities tested by the SAT.”
165
 Such a definition has the appearance of 
specificity, yet both “variety of methods” and “relatively short time” are vague enough terms to 
warrant considerable confusion through their inherent ambiguity. The College Board 
distinguished between legitimate teaching and dubious coaching by each job‟s level of direct 
reference to the SAT itself without ever setting an actual threshold.  
 Likewise, the booklet‟s writers denied that aptitude was “fixed and impervious to 
influence,” and instead defined it as “abilities that seem to grow slowly and stubbornly […] at 
home and at school over the years, but not responding [sic] to hasty attempts to relive a young 
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 The College Board‟s defense of this definition resides in the phrase “slowly and 
stubbornly,” indicating that the capacity to succeed in higher education, or to succeed in general, 
could not be augmented overnight.  This sentiment suggests that the intellectual molding of 
children is not only a slow process, but also nearly set by the time an adolescent reaches the end 
of their secondary schooling. In this vein, the capacity for collegiate education was built off of 
the aptitude accumulated in one‟s youth, but such capacity was also referent to knowledge 
different than what one would accrue in college.  
 However, the College Board‟s disapproval of test-coaching rested on the assertion that 
SAT scores naturally tended to rise between students‟ junior and senior years of high school. 
Hence, the College Board simultaneously maintained that the aptitude of a student was 
impervious to concentrated instructional efforts, but that the several month period between a 
typical student‟s first and second sitting for the SAT (generally including a summer holiday 
without schooling) somehow accorded most students enough growth for statistically significant 
or practical changes in their SAT scores. The agency resolved this contradiction by deducing that 
any gains made by students on their SAT scores after test-coaching could not be attributed to 
test-coaching because these gains became statistically insignificant when one factored out the 
average gain made by students on the SAT between their junior and senior years. Given that the 
average gains made by students on successive attempts at the SAT could well have been a 
composite of very high gains and considerable losses, those children who raised their SAT scores 
considerably after test-prep may have been able to do so without coaching.
167
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 Following the trustees‟ official statement, Effects of Coaching presents summaries for 
seven studies designed to prove the uselessness of test-coaching, albeit with convoluted 
methodology and heady reasoning. The first report discussed, Henry Dyer‟s 1953 study on the 
effect of coaching on SAT performance for boys at a college preparatory school, illustrates the 
Board‟s ideas on what actions constitute coaching. During the seven months between the 
baseline-test and post-test, Dyer‟s experimental subjects were accorded only six hours of verbal 
coaching and four hours of mathematical coaching, for which “neither instructors nor students 
were given answers to” the ten-to-thirty minute coaching lessons.
168
   
 Instead, Dyer and the College Board presumed that one ought to be able to use logical 
reasoning to solve SAT questions (e.g., analogy or geometry questions) because it should be the 
same logical reasoning one is taught in school and experiences in society. Hence, coaching 
methods would be useless because they only reiterated the same logical reasoning patterns seen 
at home and in school. Ironically, Dyer assumed that children from sub-standard schools or less-
affluent homes would not benefit from coaching either, as there simply was not enough time to 
correct sixteen to eighteen years of ignorance. Dyer‟s conclusion is affirmed regardless of the 
findings. The cart supported the horse. Unsurprisingly, the boys of School X achieved average 
gains on their SAT-Verbal score only 4.6 points higher than the gains made by their peers at 
School Y. Although the SAT-Mathematics scores of coached students who weren‟t enrolled in a 
math course rose on average 29.2 points higher than those scores of similar un-coached students, 
Dyer still deemed coaching to generate statistically insignificant results.
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 These findings are followed (and reaffirmed) by a summary for John French‟s 1955 study 
on the impact of test-coaching on the SAT scores of children from public schools. Like Dyer, 
French employed a curious framework for coaching. The 126 Massachusetts seniors in the study 
who received verbal coaching were provided with “an average of 90 minutes [with] the school‟s 
special 500-word vocabulary list,” permission to briefly view an easily-accessible publication not 
designed for the SAT, and one and one-half hours of access to facsimile SAT-Verbal questions 
sometime in the seven-month gap between the study‟s pre-test and post-test.
170
  The 188 other 
Massachusetts students in the experimental group were given “[twenty] special assignments” of 
facsimile SAT-Math and SAT-Verbal items designed by ETS.
171
  The average gains made by 
both coached groups were declared statistically insignificant when compared to those made by a 
control group from Michigan on respective post-tests.  
 However, these findings also illustrate the College Board‟s rather broad view on the 
statistical significance of SAT scores. French based his findings off of “the standard error of 
measurement” for the SAT, or, the expected sway for any given individual‟s performance on the 
SAT were they to repeatedly take the examination.
172
 The writers of Effects of Coaching noted 
that the SAT-Verbal and SAT-Math had standard errors of measurement of 32 and 34 points, 
respectively. Students with average results on the SAT could earn scores dozens of points higher 
or lower on subsequent administrations of the exam yet not make statistically significant 
changes, despite what students, parents, teachers, or admissions officers may have believed. 
Further, the report suggested the belief that such a broad standard error of measurement did not 
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necessarily penalize students who may have had an “off” day, or unfavorably rewarded students 
who eked out a performance just over a college‟s tacit cutoff point for applicants. 
 The seven studies in the pamphlet, the most recent of which conducted in 1962, served as 
the rhetorical and scientific basis for College Board‟s disdain toward test-coaching. Yet, Effects 
of Coaching was by no means the College Board or ETS‟s final edict on the horrors of test-prep 
during the 1960s and 1970s. Coffman and Neun‟s 1966 study concluded that coaching students 
with speed-reading techniques did not improve SAT-Verbal scores as the college freshman used 
in the experiment showed no significant aggregate improvement. Roberts and Oppenheim‟s 1966 
investigation of the PSAT‟s coachability concluded that socioeconomically disadvantaged 
youths would not benefit from, and could harmed by, test-coaching. Meanwhile, a 1979 study by 
Alderman and Powers determined that students coached for the SAT-Verbal section typically 
answered only one more question correctly than un-coached students. 
173
 The College Board 
continuously felt compelled to demonstrate that its distrust of test-coaching was rooted in its 
faith in psychometric evidence and not the urge to maintain business viability. 
 However, Effects of Coaching on Scholastic Aptitude Test Scores did not silence those 
who had had qualms with the SAT, most notable of whom being the mathematician Banesh 
Hoffman. Hoffman argued that the state of standardized testing was “not only dangerous but in a 
profound sense unscientific.”
174
 Psychometricians manipulated statistics in order to claim that 
questions were well-written and answers were logically sound. The design of standardized tests 
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rewarded those who shallowly applied knowledge, and penalized students who noticed the 
nuance and ambiguity within many exam questions. In turn, the attempt to measure intelligence 
through multiple-choice standardized tests was an anti-intellectual exercise in quantifying 
intangible qualities. In Hoffman‟s view, other versions of multiple-choice standardized testing, 
such as the Westinghouse Science Talent Search, made an “incredible mockery of sense and 
science” in the aim to reduce the potential number of high-scoring test-takers.
175
 Yet, Hoffman‟s 
ire may be seen as part of a broader academic scrutiny on the limits of standardized testing, as 
well as the capabilities of the test-taking audience. 
Wising Up, Dumbing Down, and Aiming For the Middle 
 Though many psychometricians denied the effectiveness of test-coaching, some began to 
accept during the 1960s and 1970s the possibility that performances on aptitude and achievement 
tests could be swayed by individuals‟ respective reactions to the composition of the tests 
themselves. Researchers embarked upon qualifying and quantifying “test-wiseness,” or, the 
ability to manipulate “the characteristics and formats of the test and/or the test taking situation to 
receive a high score.”
176
 The touchstone for much research on test-wiseness is a 1965 article 
composed by Jason Millman, Carol Bishop, and Robert Ebel (himself a former researcher for 
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ETS), who argued that a student‟s level of test-wiseness was “logically independent of the 
[student‟s] knowledge of the subject matter.”
177
 Students who had a middling grasp on an exam‟s 
content could still fare well if they could use the exam‟s format to their advantage. 
 Millman, Bishop, and Ebel were unable to discern whether test-wiseness was a teachable 
concept or a broader aptitude innate to a person. However, the researchers did qualify two types 
of test-wiseness. Some aspects, such as pacing strategies, guessing techniques, and deductive 
reasoning, were found to operate “independent of test construction or test purpose.” 
178
 Others 
elements of test-wiseness, such as recognizing recurrent patterns in erroneous answer choices, or 
thinking only as sophisticatedly as the design of the exam, relied on the particular design of an 
exam. Since these techniques allowed many students to perform better on exams than their 
knowledge of the material examined ought to have warranted, the researchers believed that test-
wiseness needed further investigation in order to determine how to reduce tests‟ vulnerability to 
test-wiseness. Rather than reward savvy and recognize sophisticated thinking as a facet of 
intelligence in its own right, certain psychometricians and educational psychologists of the 1960s 
saw test-wiseness as an impediment to actually measuring students‟ aptitudes.  
 Concerns rose as several studies attempted to determine if test-wiseness could be taught 
to students and then successfully applied to examinations. In a 1968 study for the American 
Educational Research Journal, Leonard Kreit compared the IQ test scores of two groups of 
Indiana third-graders: those who were administered an IQ test “at the beginning and end of the 
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school year,” and those who were administered several IQ tests throughout the school year.
179
 
Kreit‟s results were inconclusive. While the experimental group did retain augmented IQ scores 
through their final examination, the control also improved their IQ test scores on the end-of-year 
exam, thus rendering the experimental group‟s level of improvement less than statistically 
significant. However, a study published in the Winter, 1970, edition of The Journal of 
Educational Measurement lent credence to the notion that test-wiseness was trainable and 
retainable. The authors of the study subjected two groups of high school seniors to one of “[t]wo 
programmed texts” that taught elimination and guessing strategies for multiple-choice tests.
180
  
Each experimental group served as the other‟s respective control. After testing both groups the 
day following and two weeks after their instruction with the 40-minute programmed tests, the 
researchers concluded that elements of test-wiseness could be coached and retained.  
 Yet, as more psychometricians and educational psychologists became keen to the concept 
of test-wiseness, American youth became increasingly unable to perform well on the SAT. 
Peaking in the 1962-63 academic year with a combined score of 980, the average SAT score had 
declined to 951 by the end of the 1960s.
181
 In turn, SAT scores were declining for the yearly pool 
of students who took the examination in the spring of their junior year of high school and then 
retook the exam in the winter of their senior year. Quite often, students sat for the exam in March 
or May, and did so once again December or January. The average improvement for these 
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candidates declined considerably between 1962 and 1968.
182
 Each year, students were 
performing more poorly than their predecessors, and were making less significant improvements 
in their SAT scores when retaking the exam. When pressed for an explanation, researchers could 
only surmise that “students [tended] to repeat the test regardless of their initial score.”
183
 If more 
students retook the SAT, then the chance of significant aggregate levels of improvement between 
tests diminished. By the mid-1970s, SAT candidates were exhibiting not only poorer aggregate 
average performance, but also increasingly infrequent exceptional scores. In 1975, only 15 




 By the mid-1970s, the College Board began to hunt for what was responsible for the 
protracted SAT score decline. Just as in Effects of Coaching, the only suspect ruled out by the 
College Board was the SAT itself. In a brief essay for The English Journal, the College Board‟s 
executive director asserted that “the SAT score scale [had] continued to have highly consistent 
meaning,” and that examinees‟ aggregate performances were truly responsible for the cause for 
the decline.
185
 This sentiment was reaffirmed in 1977, when both ETS and the College Board 
organized an advisory panel to determine the roots of the continued decline in SAT scores. The 
findings were subsequently published as the report On Further Examination. The panel declared 
                                                        
182
 Thomas F. Donlon and William H. Angoff, ―Table 2.20: Seven-year summary of change in SAT-verbal 
scores from March or May of the junior year to December or January of the senior year,‖ and ―Table 2.21: Seven-
year summary of change in SAT-mathematical scores from March or May of the junior year to December or January 
of the senior year,‖ in The College Board Admissions Testing Program: A technical report on research and 
development activities relating to the Scholastic Aptitude Test and Achievement Tests, ed. William H. Angoff (New 
York: College Entrance Examination Board, 1971), 43, 44. 
183
 Donlon and Angoff, College Board Admissions Testing Program, 42. 
184
 Richard Hagan, ―Newsnotes,‖ Phi Delta Kappan 58, no. 2 (October 1976): 221, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20298520 (last accessed March 10, 2011). 
185
 William H. Angoff, ―Viewpoint: Why the SAT Scores Are Going Down,‖ The English Journal 64, no. 3 
(March 1975): 10, http://www.jstor.org/stable/815043 (last accessed March 10, 2011). 
 75 
that the factor most responsible for the SAT-score decline was the “change in the composition of 
the student group taking the test,” or in less gilt terms, poor and minority students.
186
 With 
rhetorical plodding, the panel validated this claim by arguing that the SAT itself was an 
unfaltering assessment of aptitude, and that its ability to predict students‟ college marks was 
stable.
187
 If all test-takers‟ scores were referent to a scoring scale left untouched since the early 
1940s, then one could not blame the decline on the structure of SAT scores. However arbitrary a 
1340 or 870 score may have been, the numbers had consistent meaning. 
 However, the panel contradicted itself two paragraphs later by admitting that “an „upward 
drift‟ of between 8 and 12 points in the scaling of the scores” occurred between 1963 and 
1973.
188
 If SAT performances routinely registered nearly a dozen points higher in 1973 than they 
would have a decade prior, then such variance casts doubt on the focus of statistical significance 
with the scores. That is, if the range of eight to twelve scaled points was statistically insignificant 
within the scaled score range of the SAT, then making note of this variance was without merit 
unless its omission would have placed the overall score decline within statistical significance.  
Yet, the report reaffirmed that any disproportionate faith placed in aptitude tests during the 
college admissions process was the fault of admissions officers and not the College Board. 
 Rather, the panel for On Further Examination deduced that the protracted decline in SAT 
scores was symptomatic of decaying American educational standards. The panel lamented the 
expanse of college-going students “with barely a speaking acquaintance with the English 
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language and no writing facility at all.”
189
 In turn, the Board blamed the decreased correlation 
between SAT scores and first-year college grades not on the exam‟s diminished relevance, but 
on grade inflation. That is, the exam had not gotten harder, but education had become simpler. 
Further, the panel expressed grave concerns about how SAT scores may have been negatively 
influenced by the role of “tape recorders, films[,] film strips, television[…] and the like” in the 
modern pedagogical process.
190
  This was ironic given that the first president of ETS marveled 
over the educational possibilities of such media. Nonetheless, the point was clear. The 
educational structure of America had writ large loosened its standards beyond acceptable 
standards, and test prep was but one of many factors. 
 Psychometric pride aside, why would the College Board and ETS be so persistent in 
affirming their standardized tests‟ stability and un-coachability? As Edward Fiske noted in his 
journalistic work for the New York Times, one cannot ignore the demographic shift of college 
students during the 1960s; “the number of persons in college soared from 3,582,700 to 
7,920,000” between 1960 and 1970.
191
 In turn, the value of standardized tests and entrance 
exams grew because they were a more convenient way to discern who among the increasingly 
broader pool of college hopefuls were truly capable of tackling higher education. One may 
surmise that the value of test prep also grew due to this massive growth of the college-bound and 
college-hopeful populations.  If more people sought to attend college, more people may have 
sought a way to distinguish themselves through impressive test scores. 
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 Demographics for New York City show that labor responsibilities for adolescents were 
considerably lower by the beginning of the 1970s that they had been in previous decades. Of the 
740,627 city residents between sixteen and nineteen years of age in 1970, only 261,067 were 
members of the labor force, and 236,029 of them were actively and non-militarily employed at 
the time. The figures for younger legally employable minors were far lower, as merely 27,678 of 
the city‟s 412,437 fourteen- and fifteen-year old residents were in the labor force. Of those 
24,211 fourteen- and fifteen-year olds in the city who were actively employed in 1970, only 
7,023 (less than two percent of all city youth in that age group) were working full-time.
192
 
Although one cannot ignore instances of minors employed outside the formal economic sector, 
one may reason that adolescents had a diminished obligation to be a source of income for their 
family. (Or, perhaps, employers saw little incentive in employing younger minors beyond part-
time status.)   
 The advent of the American College Testing Program (ACT) may have also spurred the 
College Board and ETS to be persistent in claiming their exams‟ un-coachability. Developed by 
E.F. Lundquist and Ted McCarrell, both of the State University of Iowa, the ACT was crafted to 
“evaluate intellectual capacities in English, mathematics, social studies, and the natural 
sciences,” thus ostensibly seeking to measure more skills than the SAT did.
193
 In turn, the ACT 
catered to those American colleges and universities that felt neglected by the College Board and 
ETS. Most of these institutions were in the western, northwestern, and midwestern United States, 
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and felt that the College Board examinations only reinforced elitism from and through 
northeastern schools.  
 The development of the ACT also occurred when Americans were consumed with “the 
search for „education for survival.‟”
194
 The 36,399,802 American youths in primary and 
secondary schools at the turn of the 1960s could not be wrongly lulled through poor education 
into accepting a position subservient to the Soviet Union. Like the College Board and ETS, the 
ACT program also kept tabs on its test-takers‟ initial college marks.  Unlike the arbiters of the 
SAT, the directors of the ACT placed great emphasis on using such information to see if the high 
school curricula of test-takers had adequately prepared them for collegiate-level work.
195
 
Lindquist did not see the ACT as a test that would mimic the SAT in either style or purpose. 
Instead of “‟skimming the cream off the top,‟” the ACT was designed to “delet[e] the least 
qualified from the bottom.‟”
196
 If the exam‟s purpose was to merely discount those students who 
showed a lack of adequate collegiate-level capabilities, then the exam shifted the purpose of 
taking standardized entrance tests. The aim was no longer pursuing the most prestigious 
institutions, but rather demonstrating that one would be a good fit at some college, somewhere. 
 In its first year alone, the ACT attracted a considerable number of examination 
candidates. According to the New York Times, “125,604 college applicants took part in the 
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program” during the 1959-1960 academic year.
197
 However, a 1961 study conducted by Frank 
Peters and Eugenia Plog may have dispelled some of the test‟s early accolades. The researchers 
studied the efficacy of the ACT as a substitute for Ohio State University‟s series of mathematics 
and English entry-placement exams. Peters and Plog noted that the ACT, when taken as a whole, 
was slightly more effective than the precedent Ohio State Psychological Examination, but that 




 Even if researchers found early imperfections in the ACT‟s capabilities, the examination 
still created more mainstream space into which the test-prep industry could wriggle. As Stanley 
Kaplan noted in his autobiography, the ACT had made those in charge of the College Board and 
ETS nervous, as the organizations could have lost their authority had the exam initially became 
popular in regions that were traditionally SAT-strongholds.
199
 However, the ACT first gained 
strength outside of the eastern United States, thus increasing the possibility of any college-
hopeful student of having to take a standardized entrance exam.
200
 Although the original purpose 
of the ACT was to winnow out only those seemingly deficient in college-level aptitude, Peters 
and Plog‟s study indicate that universities were willing to use ACT results to cordon students by 
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their different entry-level capabilities: the standardized test also became the placement exam. 
This may have potentially created a broader test-prep market. Students could use coaching not 
only to get in, but also to better secure more advanced classes, and in turn, a timelier graduation. 
Push the Button, Win a Prize 
 Test-prep entrepreneurs did not benefit solely from a broadened standardized testing 
field. The industry also became more acceptable due to pedagogical and judicial developments in 
the American educational system at-large. One educational phenomenon during the late 1960s 
and early 1970s that may have affected the American public‟s later opinions of the test-prep 
industry was performance contracting. Developed by the Office of Economic Opportunity, 
performance contracting “involve[d] payment of incentives to students, teachers, and private 
educational contractors, depending on improvements in student performance.”
201
 The 
organization allotted grant money to businesses and corporations that designed accelerated 
learning programs for children who had considerably deficient reading and mathematics skills. 
Such programs were premised on developing students‟ skills through the use of “teaching 
machines,” proto-computer devices programmed with tutorials that doled out instruction at the 
student‟s own pace of learning.
202
 When students showed progress in their studies, they were 
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then given rewards, ranging from trinkets to spare change to electronic goods, depending on the 
rate and level of a student‟s improvement.
203
  
 However, proponents of these programs maintained that “[r]egardless of the variety of 
methods, materials, and approaches […] the single most important factor contributing to the 
success of a [performance contracting] reading program is the teacher.”
204
 This sentiment 
parallels the beliefs espoused by Chauncey in ETS‟s early Annual Reports. Educational Testing 
Service stressed that teaching contained a certain irreducible, ineffable element, one that could 
not be replaced by any set of educational programming or testing. Performance contractors felt 
likewise. Conversely, test prep could be defined as something besides teaching simply because 
its aims could be fully defined. If all the components of standardized test preparation could be 
fully defined through its methods, then it did not depend upon the mysterious and un-categorical 
aspect of a good teacher, and thus, was illegitimate.  
 The first instance of performance contracting occurred in Texarkana, Arkansas, when the 
city‟s school district hired Dorsett Educational Systems to improve the basic skills of students 
“who had been identified as being two years or more behind grade level.”
205
 Using a series of 
film strips, Dorsett sought to improve each student‟s mastery of basic skills by one grade level 
within 80 instructional hours. For every student who met this guideline, Dorsett was 
compensated $80, while accelerated and retarded rates of improvement were inversely 
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 The practice of performance contracting soon gained luster, and by the fall of 
1970, the Office of Economic Opportunity had allocated $6.5 million for performance 
contracting programs in twenty school districts.
207
 That same year, the school board of Gary, 
Indiana entered a direct, four-year arrangement with Behavioral Research Laboratory, albeit 
without funding from the O.E.O. nor clear contractual stipulations. To the dismay of the Gary‟s 
teachers‟ union, Behavioral Research Laboratories would act as “manage[r of] Banneker 
Elementary,” a school that had found to be poorly administered and underperforming by the 
Indiana Board of Education.
208
 
 Ironically, businesses that entered into performance contracting arrangements with school 
districts often had to produce results superior to those that had been made by the school systems 
in order to receive monetary re-compensation or profit. Most performance contracts 
arrangements stipulated that businesses would not recoup their expenditures for students who did 
not display a rate of learning quicker than what they had achieved in school. These programs 
typically had to “improve students‟ performance in reading and mathematics by 1.6 grades in 
order to break even,” even though the average student enrolled in a performance contract 
program accelerated at less than one-third this rate during an academic year of traditional 
schooling.
209
  Hence, in order to be seen as suitable alternatives or supplements for traditional 
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education, performance contractors had to generate results superior to what schools had been 
capable of producing. 
 As quickly as performance contracting had gained acceptability across the country, the 
theory lost its appeal just as quickly, especially after an investigation of Dorsett‟s Texarkana 
program revealed “that students had been, in advance, taught the answers to test questions.”
210
 
By early 1972, the Office of Economic Opportunity deemed its experiment with performance 
contracting wholly unsuccessful.
211
 The public distrust of performance contractors, and similarly, 
test-prep companies, was rooted in a sense of fraud: educational programs and practices feel 
fraudulent when they only serve their own extant purposes. Dorsett became regarded as 
fraudulent because students were allegedly coached for post-course examination that determined 
the level of compensation the company would receive. This public disapproval was similar to the 
public dismissal of test-prep companies as little more than “cram schools,” where students were 
force-fed questions.  
 The burden of proof found in performance contracting profit margins had an analogue in 
the burden of proof for the test-prep industry. For ETS, and in turn, the American public, the 
test-prep industry could not claim success any time a student who had purchased a prep course 
performed well on a standardized test. Rather, these parties would grant test-prep companies 
credence only when students‟ scores surpassed not only a threshold of statistical significance, but 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2007), 
http://ezproxy.lib.ucf.edu/login?url=/docview/119138616?accountid=10003 (last accessed March 12, 2011).  
210
 Jack Rosenthal, ―Performance Contracts Lose Luster,‖ New York Times 10 January, 1972: E25, 
ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2007), 
http://ezproxy.lib.ucf.edu/login?url=/docview/119423143?accountid=10003 (last accessed March 12, 2011). . 
211
 Jack Rosenthal, ―Learning-Plan Test Is Called A Failure,‖ New York Times 1 February, 1972: A1, A30, 
ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2007), 
http://ezproxy.lib.ucf.edu/login?url=/docview/119396042?accountid=10003 (last accessed March 12, 2011).  
 84 
also the level of improvement arbitrarily deemed attributable to additional schooling and mental 
maturation. Akin to performance contracting, test-prep companies had to surpass traditional 
measures of test readiness in order to be seen as legitimate educational devices.  
 Federal judicial rulings also created space for the test-prep industry during this time 
period, especially in the United States Supreme Court case Lemon v. Kurtzman. Originating in 
the U.S District Court of Eastern Pennsylvania, the case dealt with the constitutionality of 
funding the secular aspects of sectarian nonpublic education with state gambling taxes.
212
 Nine 
parties filed suit against State Superintendant Donald Kurtzman as well as the heads of several 
sectarian private schools, maintaining that the Pennsylvania Nonpublic School Aid Act breached 
the separation of church and state. Further, the plaintiffs alleged that state law “‟perpetuate[d] 
and promote[d] segregation‟” because of the inherent discriminatory nature of nonpublic 
education, religious or otherwise.
213
  The Court, led by Chief Justice Warren Burger, found in 
favor of the plaintiffs in June, 1971. As Cornelius Golden noted, the Court found actions taken 
through the Pennsylvania Nonpublic School Aid Act created “excessive entanglement [between 
church and State…] in the aggregate but perhaps not individually.”
214
 The case did bounce back 
to the Supreme Court the following year after the East Pennsylvania District Court “permitted 
[Pennsylvania] to reimburse nonpublic sectarian schools for services provided before [the 
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Supreme Court‟s] decision in Lemon I.”
215
 The Supreme Court upheld the District Court‟s ruling, 
citing precedence on nonretroactive activity. 
 If Lemon placed a thicker barrier between religious education and state and federal 
governmental funding, then the Court‟s decision may have also allowed nonpublic educational 
institutions and enterprises greater pedagogical leeway. As Golden noted in his discussion of 
Lemon’s relationship to school vouchers, education is not a constitutionally-guaranteed right—
but rather, a facet of everyday life that could be considered a “fundamental interest.”
216
 This 
point may be used to consider the relationship between government and all nonpublic education 
during the 1970s. While the precedent case Everson v. Board of Education “demonstrated the 
permeability of the wall” between church and state in the context of education, Lemon v. 
Kurtzman established that this wall was not overly porous.
217
 Given that the federal government 
could give neither preferential nor prejudicial treatment toward nonpublic education, sectarian or 
otherwise, then Lemon only helped strengthen the libertarian principles of nonpublic education 
and educational principles.   
 Corollary to Lemon, the advent of school voucher programs prompted educational 
theorists and critics to argue over the ethicality and constitutionality of charter school programs. 
These nascent debates centered on what the reasonable boundaries were for “the [demand] of 
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 The viability of school voucher programs rested on the belief that 
education, while a necessity, was subject to the same market conditions as other vital goods and 
services. In a voucher system, educational “proprietors—public and private[…]—would compete 
for the custom of buyers (parents) all of whom have been made substantially equal in their power 
to purchase admission”
219
 A school‟s tuition would be variable, respective to a family‟s income, 
with poorer families paying more nominal fees and richer families contributing heftier sums.  
 John Coons and Stephen Sugarman, who collaborated to draft the Family Choice in 
Education Act (FCEA), believed that voucher programs would help “purge public education of 
discrimination against poor districts and poor people.”
220
 The men argued that school districts 
had become illegitimate units of educational oversight because they could not guarantee parity of 
either educational quality or opportunity. Like Lemon, school voucher programs created space 
for the test-prep industry within American education. If the extant educational system unsuitably 
prepared broad patches of American youth for the working world or higher education, then the 
test-prep industry served as part of a broad spectrum of alternative approaches, or at least a 
suitable stop-gap, for those who could afford such measures.  
Stumbling Toward Acceptability  
 Perhaps the biggest hurdle for test-prep companies to clear was the Federal Trade 
Commission‟s (FTC‟s) investigation of the industry during the late 1970s.  Given the vast 
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expansion of the college-going and college-hopeful populations during the previous two decades, 
as well as the spectacular claims that certain test-prep companies made about their ability to raise 
test scores, the FTC felt it necessary to probe into the $60-million industry to assess its ethicality 
and legality. Although plans to investigate the test-prep industry were first announced in late 
1976, the commission‟s report would not be finished for another two and a-half years. The 
results, however, would directly alter the relationship between standardized test manufacturers, 
test-coaches, and the American public.
221
  
 With its investigation, the FTC‟s Bureau of Consumer Protection sought to “estimate 
statistically the impact of commercial coaching on SAT scores.”
222
 However, the Bureau 
explicitly stressed in the introduction of its report that the investigation could not be categorized 
as experimental as there was no un-coached control group to which the students of the coaching 
schools under investigation would be compared.  Although more statistically- and scientifically-
sound results may have been attained by arranging a control group, the Bureau expressed in its 
report that such actions would have been financially and ethically unsound. The Bureau felt that 
they could not “[deny] access to commercial coaching to students who want[ed] it.”
223
 Should 
coaching have proven effective, parents may have been incensed over a policy that hobbled their 
children‟s chances on the SAT. Investigators for the Bureau analyzed the records of “three 
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coaching schools in the New York metropolitan area” for the academic years between 1974 and 
1977.
224
 The investigators soon dropped one of these programs from its investigation due to its 
overly-small clientele pool. The customer information for the two remaining schools was 
corroborated against ETS and College Board files for all SAT candidates who resided in the 
same postal-code hubs as the majority of the coaching schools‟ clientele.  
 However, the companies under investigation were not initially eager to relinquish their 
clienteles‟ personal information, which led to arbitration in the United States District Court for 
the State of Massachusetts. In Federal Trade Commission v. Stanley H. Kaplan Educational 
Center, Ltd., et al, the FTC petitioned the court to have Kaplan comply with a subpoena duces 
tecum.
225
 Presiding judge D.J. Tauro deferred in part to the decision made by the Supreme Court 
in FCC v. Schreiber.  Tauro noted that Schreiber set the precedent that “courts should not 
substitute their judgment for that of regulatory agencies more familiar with the industries they 
are charged with regulating.”
226
 Hence, the court would not honor Kaplan and others‟ request 
because the FTC had a better understanding of what would be necessary for a thorough and valid 
investigation. 
 Once obtained, the files of these SAT-prep course clients were then referenced against 
ETS‟s list of SAT candidates from the New York metropolitan area for the three academic years 
under question. Coaching school files that lacked corroboration in ETS‟s files were disregarded. 
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From this process, the Bureau identified 1,568 coached students. This pool was further 
winnowed to roughly 1,000; coached students who never took the SAT, took it outside the New 
York City metropolitan area, or took the ACT instead were discounted.
227
 Meanwhile, the 
Bureau randomly selected the SAT-score records for 2,500 un-coached students from ETS‟s 
files; this latter group served as the non-experimental control. 
 The investigators also sought to clarify any preexisting discrepancies between the control 
and experimental groups by comparing their respective responses on the Student Demographic 
Questionnaire (SDQ), which was administered during each examination date for the SAT and 
“voluntarily completed by […] students.”
228
 Investigators determined that students who attended 
a coaching school tended to have higher course marks and PSAT scores than their un-coached 
peers.  Coached students were more often than not “A” students in their English and math 
courses, while un-coached students were more often than not “B” students in these same 
subjects. The income figures between the two groups present a starker difference. Over two-
fifths of the coached students came from families whose parental incomes exceeded $30,000 per 
year, a figure which, if adjusted for inflation for the years between 1974 and 1978, would have 
an income equivalency range of $100,322 to $132,691 in 2010. Meanwhile, nearly one-half of 
the un-coached students came from households with incomes less than $18,000 per year. When 
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 Investigators employed multiple regression analyses in order to best gauge the genuine 
impact of coaching on test scores. This statistical technique was preferred to others because it 
allowed the “ability to analyze the impact of one variable on another variable while [… holding 
constant] the effects of several other factors.”
230
 Given the sheer variance within the SAT 
candidacy in any given exam administration, the Bureau found it necessary to program their 
analyses to account for gender, income, high school marks, class rank, high school type, PSAT 
scores, and distance between PSAT and SAT sittings. Hence, the effect of test-prep on test 
performance could not be easily accused of being unfairly augmented or mitigated.   
 The Bureau determined “that coaching was effective at one of the two schools.”
231
 
Stanley H Kaplan Educational Centers produced, on average, a fifty-point increase in customers‟ 
composite SAT scores. However, this figure is somewhat misleading as the average rates of 
improvement attributable to coaching among the four different testing dates used in the study 
varied from 35.1 points to 71 points. When confidence intervals were considered, the rate of 
improvement attributable to Kaplan‟s coaching ranged from 31 to 67 points, and among 
individual test dates, confidence intervals ranged from 2 points to 96 points. The other coaching 
school under investigation, Test-preparation Center, Inc., had drearier results. On average, 
students coached by Test-preparation Center had a mere 3.6-point improvement on their 
composite SAT scores, and their performances on the verbal section tended to slightly decline.
232
 
 A perusal of Test-preparation Center‟s advertisements in the New York Times reveals a 
fundamental difference between their and Kaplan‟s operations. Bizarre interaction with the 
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NSATI aside, Kaplan refused to operate without preponderant control over its material. Stanley 
Kaplan went so far as to hand-pick new center managers during the early expansion of his 
business in order to ensure that every office outside of New York City operated according to his 
standards
233
. However, as seen in a 1975 ad in the New York Times, the Bronx-based Test-
preparation Center did not necessarily engage in such tight-knit management: 
PART TIME [:] Hi profit biz oppty [sic] created by & for educators. Administer 
and educational program in your community. Contact TEST-PREPARATION 




 For a “low investment,” one could manage a Test-preparation Centers branch.
235
 The 
company also directly courted teachers in the classifieds section of the Times. Test-preparation 
Center offered math teachers fifteen dollars per hour for part-time after-school work on 
Wednesday afternoons. For one 105-minute class, a teacher could earn $26.25—a figure with the 
same purchasing power as $106.37 in 2010.
236
 Although the company openly advertising the 
wages it would pay its employees, it did not use its advertisements to specify how much its SAT-
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 Yet, the Bureau heavily mitigated its findings in the report‟s second half. The 
investigators were insistent on demonstrating the fallacy in “concluding that School A [Kaplan] 
„works‟ and School B [Test-preparation] does not.”
238
 The ability to diminish the findings 
depended upon the adherence to a buzzword of objective standardized testing, 
“underachievement.” According to the investigators, if students did poorly on the SAT “given 
their demographics and other personal characteristics” before being coached, then coaching may 
not have caused genuine improvement.
239
 More bluntly, if a coaching school led students to live 
up to expectations, then such improvement was not from genuine coaching. Such students were 
led to coaching through self-selection, i.e., recognizing the range of their alleged capabilities, 
rather than the desire to attain outstanding SAT scores.  
 Had the Bureau unequivocally reported that certain coaching schools could consistently 
produce genuine improvement in students‟ SAT scores, then Educational Testing Service might 
have been in an unenviable position. However, ETS may have been partially responsible for the 
tone of the Bureau‟s final product. R. Jeffrey Smith alleged that the Federal Trade Commission 
was “[h]arassed by [ETS] and nervous about a document lending credence to a suspect 
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 The FTC decided to release the document only after a considerable delay and with 
several pointed caveats—and following the resignation of Arthur Levine, who oversaw the 
investigation.
241
 When questioned, Consumer Affairs staffers remarked that the findings did not 
“provide enough information to question the legitimacy of standardized tests themselves”; the 
study lacked a scientifically genuine control group of students, and thus could not be trusted 
beyond a minimal degree.
242
   
 Yet the FTC‟s findings—however tepid—were enough for the test-prep industry to claim 
a quantum of legitimacy. Following the report, Stanley Kaplan used rhetorical deference to give 
his company extra credibility. By asserting that “‟cram courses do not help,‟” Kaplan distanced 
his company from its competition, but also implied to the public that the test-prep industry 
should not be seen as a cohort of enterprises with a shared agenda or product, but merely a broad 
spectrum of companies dependent upon the continued use of standardized exams.
243
 Although 
the FTC study sought to determine if the test-prep industry had engaged in consumer fraud, the 
results may have ironically spurred some justification for certain test-prep companies to demand 
high prices for their goods. Whereas Test-preparation Center charged $75 for its SAT prep 
course, Kaplan charged $250.
244
 Even factoring in the number of hours spent in direct classroom 
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instruction, a client would have paid $3.125 per hour of instruction at Test-preparation Center 
versus $6.25 per hour at Kaplan. This per-hour cost comparison may seem somewhat misleading 
because, as noted earlier, Kaplan had devised dozens of hours of supplemental audio material 
students could use while at a Kaplan center. But, the use of such material was optional, as a 
client could use as much or as little of Kaplan‟s Test-n-Tape system as he or she desired.  
 Regardless, the FTC report may have reinforced and popularized Kaplan‟s method of 
operation; one paid considerably more for test-prep not for what one is required to do in a prep 
course, but for the myriad possible ways one could prep using a company‟s materials. If a 
student were to customize and fully use the supplementary material, then Kaplan and its 
analogues could reinforce the claim that they were engaging in long-term, multidimensional 
coaching, and that such holistic learning did not come cheaply. Conversely, clients who ignored 
the various additional materials could be dismissed as careless students and thoughtless 
consumers, since the company‟s numerous provisions mitigated that company‟s burden in 
guaranteeing significant test score improvement. 
More For Less: The Creation of the Department of Education 
 The test-prep industry‟s acquisition of legitimacy also had a bureaucratic tether: the 
creation of the Department of Education. Prior to 1979, the Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare (HEW) was the executive bureaucratic apparatus responsible for the oversight of 
American education. President Carter found the department unsuitable and unsustainable for this 
purpose. Although Carter had pledged during his presidential campaign to create a Department 
of Education, he waited until his 1978 State of the Union address to Congress to publicly re-
 95 
approach the idea of restructuring the executive Cabinet. Amplified attention to the creation of a 
separate department for education did not develop until October, 1978, when Carter personally, 
and unsuccessfully, urged Speaker of the House Tip O‟Neill to rally support for the passage of 
the House version of the Department of Education Origin Act.
245
  
 In the 1979 State of the Union address, Carter‟s educational agenda included a 
reassurance to the American public that the proposed Cabinet addition would not lead to federal 
dicta on the nature of American education. To Carter, the proposed department would instead 
serve as a “responsive and reliable partner with states, localities, and private institutions.”
246
  The 
government would not usurp power away from the traditional arbiters of pedagogical direction. 
Indeed, the president hoped that a department for education would “keep the Federal 
Government out of the administration and the decision-making involving public education.”
247
 
To this end, Carter repeatedly argued during the summer of 1979 that an extra apparatus for 
education was needed in order to slim down the executive bureaucracy as well as reduce federal 
involvement in the direction American education. Over two and-a-half years into his term 
Carter‟s aims materialized when the House approved the Department of Education Organization 
Act during the last week of September, 1979. The Senate‟s version of the bill cleared conference 
scrutiny at the same time.  
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 Public Law 96-88, signed by Carter on 17 October, 1979, attempted to retain the limited 
scope that the president sought for the new department. Within the law‟s introductory findings, 
the 96
th
 Congress stated that “parents have the primary responsibility for the education of their 
children, and states, localities, and private institutions have the primary responsibility for 
supporting that role.”
248
 If parents are the arbiters of education, then their actions are limited 
solely by the legality of those educational institutions they choose their children to attend, and 
not necessarily by the quality of the resultant education. In turn, if private institutions served a 
role in the execution of parents‟ educational demands, then education was rendered similar to a 
commodity subject to oversight. Education was legitimate so long as it was not legally 
illegitimate.  
 As stated in the law‟s next clause, the preponderance of governmental authority over 
education rested in state governments, which in turn granted that authority to school systems and 
superintendents. Given the assumed legality and legitimacy of each state‟s educational system, as 
well each state‟s local school systems‟ varying interpretations of statutes, the new department 
was left with the broad roles of “management and coordination of Federal education 
programs.”
249
 In turn, Congress maintained that communities and localities, as the purest sources 
of educational direction and policy, included a variety of educational locations. That is, 
education was not merely limited to the school, but also “libraries, museums, […] the workplace, 
[…] and the home.”
250
 If the provision of a child‟s education and molding had supplemental 
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elements in the community, then these elements were also largely outside the jurisdiction of the 
Department of Education. The department could not place restrictions on these extracurricular 
environments of learning, whatever the nature of this learning may be, unless it was in violation 
of federal law. Nor could the department obstruct the use of new technologies or pedagogical 
theories, unless they denied equal opportunity in learning. 
 Put simply, the department was given a broad mission with a short leash. The law 
mandated that the new department was to engender “the general welfare of the United States” 
through education, but not “the authority of the Federal Government over education.”
251
 As 
stated in Section 103, (b) of the law, both the Secretary and Department of Education were 
bound to accept curricular content, “library resources, textbooks, or other instructional materials 
by any educational institution or school system,” save those in violation of federal law.
252
 
Decisions over proprietary education could not be easily addressed with the new department‟s 
organization. Public Law 96-88 created six assistant secretary positions for the department, each 
with the responsibility to oversee a specific facet of education: primary and secondary education; 
post-secondary education; “vocational and adult education”; “special education and 
rehabilitation service”; “educational research and improvement;” and civil rights.
253
 Contrary to 
Carter‟s promises, there was no assistant secretary position for private education. Hence, the 
legality—and, in turn, educational legitimacy—of proprietary educational establishments and 
enterprises depended upon the decisions of other federal departments and the legislative branch.  
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 With this, the Department of Education did not have the authority to deem the test-prep 
industry legitimate or illegitimate. That judgment call could only come from the Federal Trade 
Commission. As heavily mitigated as the final version of the FTC‟s Bureau of Consumer Affairs 
investigation of the test-prep industry was, the report never clearly gave clear support or 
disapproval of the industry‟s practices or existence.  In short, the industry‟s legal and educational 
legitimacy was granted by default. The FTC could not prove beyond doubt, nor truly beyond 
skepticism, that all elements of the test-prep industry behaved unethically. The provisions of 
Public Law 96-88 compelled the Department of Education to defer to precedent federal decisions 
and local educational customs. The industry was acceptable because it was not unacceptable.  
Truth in Testing 
 At the end of the 1970s, the American public had grown weary of the clandestine 
operations of standardized test makers, in particular, those of ETS. Foremost among the 
crusaders against standardized testing were Ralph Nader and Allan Nairn. Nader alleged that 
higher education was viewed as a symbolic rather than a substantive goal. The symbolic goal of 
college education was empty because the intangible and overarching skills one ought to have 
learned in higher education were not applied to societal uplift. With this, Nader became the 
mentor of one “Allan Nairn of Princeton University,” who formed a Public Interest Research 
Group (PIRG) in order to investigate the practices of ETS.
254
  
 The polemic tome that spawned from Nairn and his PIRG‟s investigation, The Reign of 
ETS, was a sharp rebuke of ETS‟s impenetrable secrecy and seeming incompetence. Nairn‟s ire 
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stemmed from ETS‟s alleged unethical corporate behavior. Nairn charged that the organization 
was “‟supposedly a nonprofit enterprise […] operating under the rules of disclosure of a private 
company.‟”
255
 Nairn was also highly critical of the test-prep industry. The report deemed test-
coaching as little more than “a respectable form of cheating.”
256
 For Nairn, the test-prep industry 
was at best a parasitic offshoot of the entire standardized testing apparatus. 
 In May, 1979, the New York State legislature decided to force the standardized testing 
industry to operate with transparency by passing truth-in-testing legislation. In mid-June, the 
State Senate passed a resolution requiring full disclosure of each student‟s responses on a 
standardized exam, as well as the correct answers, no more than thirty days after the particular 
exam‟s administration.
257
 Following the law‟s passage in July, the notion of truth-in-testing 
gained federal legislative appeal. Democratic federal Representatives Sam Gibbons and Ted 
Weiss both offered bills that would have extended New York State‟s truth-in-testing legislation 
nationwide. Weiss‟s bill went so far as to require that standardized test makers‟ scoring and 
calculation procedures “be placed in the public domain.”
258
 
                                                        
255
 Allan Nairn, qtd. in Edward B. Fiske, ―Scholastic Testing Industry Facing Regulation by State,‖ New 
York Times, July 5, 1979: D6, ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2007), 
http://ezproxy.lib.ucf.edu/login?=docview/120802820?accountid=10003 (last accessed March 13, 2011). See also: 
Shawn G. Kennedy, ―Albany Bill Challenging Secrecy in Testing,‖ New York Times 27 May, 1979: 35, ProQuest 
Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2007), 
http://ezproxy.lib.ucf.edu/login?=docview/120819445?accountid=10003 (last accessed March 13, 2011). . 
256
 Allan Nairn, The Reign of ETS: The Corporation that Makes up Minds (Ralph Nader: 1980), 97. See 
also: Allen Nairn and Ronald Brownstein, ―Are Truth-In-Testing Laws a Fraud? No!‖ Phi Delta Kappan 61, no. 3 
(November 1979): 189-191, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20385390 (last accessed March 13, 2011). Nairn and 
Brownstein maintained that the SAT was a crucial component of college admissions because it provided universities 
a clear cutoff point; the alleged objectivity of the SAT allowed colleges to hone their admit pool in a seemingly 
rational, emotionless fashion; the onus of denial for rejection was passed back to students for their low SAT scores. 
257
 Ari L. Goldman, ―State Senate Approves Measure to Let Students See Their Aptitude Tests,‖ New York 
Times, June 15, 1979: B2, ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2007), 
http://ezproxy.lib.ucf.edu/login?=docview/120812001?accountid=10003 (last accessed March 13, 2011). 
258
 David H. Florio, ―Congress Watch,‖ Educational Researcher 8, no. 8 (September 1979): 13, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1175593 (accessed March 13. 2011). To see the proposed legislation, see: Congress, 
 100 
 The College Board did not mince words. In the opening editorial for the Fall, 1979, 
edition of The College Board Review, Jack Arbolino chided those responsible for New York 
State‟s truth-in-testing legislation. The editor remarked: 
Laws, like tests, should never promise more than they can deliver. And, 
lawmakers might well remember that in the field of education, governmental 
regulations are dangerous[; …] well-meaning laypeople and zealous lawmakers 
[can] disrupt or cripple an organization.
259
 
With this, Arbolino not only accused champions of truth-in-testing legislation of being ignorant 
of what constituted sound educational practices, but also hinted that the Carter administration‟s 
creation of the Department of Education was itself a foolhardy endeavor. In turn, The College 
Board Review was eager to publish the opinions of those educators who had likewise negative 
appraisals of truth-in-testing legislation, including educational historian Diane Ravitch. A known 
advocate of the use of the Scholastic Aptitude Tests as part of the college application process, 
Ravitch likened truth-in-testing legislation to “consumer fraud” that would unnecessarily 
increase testing costs for “student-consumer[s].”
260
  
 With this, the test-makers played a game of brinksmanship with New York State. 
Claiming that the disclosure of students‟ performances as well as each exam‟s correct answers 
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would be cost-prohibitive, several standardized test manufacturers threatened to cease operations 
in New York State at the end of the year. Others, such as the ETS, insinuated that New Yorkers 
would be subject to stiffer test prices and fewer testing windows as industry transparency would 
require consumer sacrifice. (In the 1978-1979 fiscal year, ETS earned $US 94.2 million in 
revenues.)
261
  By the very end of 1979, ETS and the College Board made an about-face. On 29 
December, the heads of both companies, along with those of several other testing companies, 
released a joint statement indicating their concurrence “that students should be able to examine 
the questions and answers on the [SAT] and other examinations.”
262
 New York high school 
students were able to take the SAT and receive full disclosure on their performance, for $14.65, a 




 Truth-in-testing legislation should have been the death knell of the test-prep industry. 
Standardized test makers could have been hobbled to the point of impotence, rendering test-prep 
                                                        
261
 Edward B. Fiske, ―Student Testing Unit‘s Expansion Stirs Debate,‖ New York Times, November 14, 
1979: A1, A11; Edward B. Fiske, ―Colleges May Lose 20 Entrance Exams,‖ New York Times, October 8, 1979: A1, 
B4; Edward B. Fiske, ―Student Questions and Answers On ‗Turth in Testing‘ Provisions,‖ New York Times, October 
10, 1979: A1, B3; and ―S.A.T. Schedule Will Be Reduced Beginning Jan. 1‖ New York Times, October 10, 1979: 
B3. Not all test manufacturers were as critical of truth-in-testing legislation as ETS, the College Board and the 
AAMC were. The Law School Admissions Council, which designed the LSAT, merely applied truth-in-testing 
standards across the country. Please see: Dena Kleiman, ―‘Truth in Testing Law‘ Faces Legality Test,‖ New York 
Times, November 9, 1979: B3. Articles in this note can be found at ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York 
Times (1851-2007), http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.lib.ucf.edu/hnpnewyorktimes?accountid=10003.  
262
 Edward B. Fiske, ―5 Exam Groups Ease Opposition To Law on Tests,‖ New York Times, December 30, 
1979: A1, ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2007), 
http://ezproxy.lib.ucf.edu/login?=docview/123872048?accountid=10003 (last accessed March 13, 2011).  
263
 Dan Hulbert, ―Q. and A. on ‗Truth in Testing,‘‖ New York Times, January 6, 1980: EDUC1, 20, 
ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2007), 
http://ezproxy.lib.ucf.edu/login?url=/docview/121164344?accountid=10003 (last accessed March 13, 2011). Those 
New York high school students who did not want full disclosure on their SAT performance still had to pay $10 to 
take the exam, which Hulbert notes included ―a $1.75 surcharge above the regular $8.25 fee‖ for other American 
high schoolers taking the SAT. 
 102 
needless. Indeed, some proponents of testing transparency alleged that New York‟s laws would 
cause “tutoring service [to] be less successful in helping students „buy‟ higher scores.”
264
 In a 
sense, it is not surprising that the test-prep magnate Stanley Kaplan would run into the arms of 
ETS amidst the torrent of Nader, Nairn, LaValle and other reformists. Despite criticism to the 
contrary, Kaplan asserted that he had “witnessed how admissions tests opened doors for 
underacheivers, late bloomers, and minorities.”
265
  
 In a 1968 essay that discussed the racially discriminatory aspects of standardized testing, 
the editors of the Columbia Law Review remarked, “Science operates on the null hypothesis—
that until proved there exists no relation between two variables. […] Furthermore, the law 
affirmatively assumes equality.”
266
 Education, in practice and principle, sits in the intersection of 
these two arenas, and thus, any facet of education that is to attain a sense of social acceptability, 
including test-prep, had to not run afoul of either scientific or legal criteria. Yet, scientific and 
legal burdens of proof do have permeable areas. Something that has not been clearly 
scientifically proven is not necessarily disproven, just as something that is not expressly and 
overtly permitted by law isn‟t necessarily illegal. It is in these areas—this defaulted 
acceptability—where the test-prep industry flourished in the 1960s and 1970s. 
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CHAPTER THREE: EVERYBODY INTO THE POOL: THE EXPANSION 
OF THE TEST-PREP INDUSTRY, 1980-1989 
 
Witnessing this insolent command, I had to use all my stores of discipline to 
quash a surge of antipathy toward him. What a baby. But my mood modulated 
as I gauged the hurt look on his face. Was I being insensitive here? […H]e had 
enough reasons to resent Luke already. Besides, maybe it was sweet in some way 




 Peruse any well-stocked chain bookstore, and one will find shelves, or perhaps even an 
entire section, devoted to test-prep material. Glossy covers shimmer under fluorescent lighting, 
enchanting all those who seek assistance with standardized entrance exams. The companies that 
produce such material, Kaplan, Barron‟s, Arco, The Princeton Review, even the College Board, 
offer practice tests, strategies, techniques, and drills, often for less than fifty dollars. Some 
guarantee improvement, while others provide supplementary information on the college 
application process and proper study habits.  
 Some study aids, such as the above-quoted Head Over Heels, which is part of Spark 
Notes‟ line of preparatory material, take a less direct approach to SAT study.  The book is 
instead meta-referential. The protagonist Francesca falls in love with her classmate Luke as he 
helps her prepare for the SAT. Along the way, readers engrossed with Francesca‟s personal and 
academic ordeals are also supposed to become better acquainted with vocabulary found on the 
SAT. College-level vocabulary is bolded within the text and succinctly defined at the bottom 
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margin of each page. At moments, the subtext of the novel is the text itself. One character, a 
teacher named Ms. Cloister, states, “‟The most bankable skill you could have in our media-
driven society is to be articulate. […] Which is to say, those who express themselves best get 
the best jobs.‟”
268
 Since this opinion is shrouded in the stentorian musings of a character, the 
reader does not feel chided, but rather congratulated for being a diligent student and savvy 
consumer.  
 The publication of texts such as Head Over Heels raises key questions: How did the 
American test-prep industry become so prominent? So commonplace? One would be hasty to 
claim that the test-prep industry‟s search for legitimacy ended with the developments of the late 
1970s. Rather, in order to show how test-prep became accepted as a culturally mainstream 
practice, this chapter shall look at the rapid expansion of the industry during the 1980s. 
Following the Federal Trade Commission‟s investigation of test-prep companies, as well as the 
spread of truth-in-testing legislation beyond New York State, the world of test-prep would 
undergo several key alterations. Kaplan, the largest test-prep company, became a subsidiary of 
the Washington Post Company and a financial success for both entities. The Princeton Review 
quickly became a formidable competitor for Kaplan, and attracted ETS‟s ire in the process. The 
industry at-large would expand into emerging media, while new factions, including the College 
Board itself, attempted to broaden the market for test-prep.  
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 By the end of the decade, both the test-prep industry and standardized test manufacturers 
were engaged in a cycle of pseudo-antagonism and symbiotic adaptation. Both parties behaved in 
ways that, on the surface, should have threatened the vitality and operational integrity of the 
other side. Actually, these maneuvers only further guaranteed that test-prep, and logically, 
standardized testing, would grow in market size and profits. This pseudo-antagonism between 
test-makers and test-coaches relied heavily on the reinvigorated debate on the social value, or in 
some eyes, scourge, of the test-prep industry and of standardized testing itself.   
The More Things Change… 
 The Federal Trade Commission‟s tepid findings did not quell the debate between 
supporters and opponents of the test-prep industry. Rather, the public academic debate over the 
ethical and educational legitimacy of the test-prep industry, as well as the SAT, was reignited 
during the early 1980s. This new bandy between psychometricians and their discontents began in 
the May, 1980, issue of the Harvard Educational Review, in which Warner Slack and Douglas 
Porter delivered a damning criticism of ETS and the SAT. Using meta-analytical statistical 
techniques, Slack and Porter alleged that the SAT was indeed coachable, and that ETS‟s claims 
to the contrary were reprehensibly damaging to the self-worth of many American youth. Were 
the test impervious to coaching, then the notion that the scores from a three-hour exam 
“accurately reflected [a student‟s] aptitude” would still be a gross distortion of the test‟s genuine 
capabilities as well as a dangerous misuse of the concept of aptitude.
269
 Even if ETS did not 
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believe that one‟s mental aptitude was innate and fixed, the nonprofit did not overtly do anything 
to dispel such a belief among the American public.
270
 
 Slack and Porter also accused ETS and the College Board of sweeping aside the results of 
certain studies “supported in part by [grants] from the College Board” that had demonstrated the 
considerably positive effects of coaching on SAT scores.
271
 In particular, the authors cited J.E. 
Marron‟s 1965 study, in which subjects had improved their overall SAT scores by an average of 
137 points after several months of coaching. In addition, Slack and Porter discussed Nathaniel 
Pallone‟s 1961 study on test coaching, in which the twelfth-graders who participated in the “six-
week, 90-minute-per-day course” improved their SAT-Verbal scores by nearly 100 points.
272
 
Pallone‟s study was instead later used by ETS as a straw man in a subsequent study.
273
 
 Such criticism did not sit lightly with ETS head Rex Jackson. In the subsequent issue of 
Harvard Educational Review, he dismissed Slack and Porter‟s criticisms as little more than “a 
pastiche of familiar charges” premised on specious evidence.
274
 Jackson noted that Slack and 
Porter‟s argument relied on overly extreme definition of aptitude not used by ETS, and that any 
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reasonable person should have understood that the SAT did not measure one‟s ultimate mental 
capabilities. Slack and Porter countered in the same issue that grasping for nuance with the term 
was irrelevant: “[t]he word „aptitude‟ implies „unchanging abilities‟ that are believed to be 
„innate.‟”
275
 Students who had little time or wherewithal to understand the finer semantic 
dimensions of “aptitude” would take their respective test scores at face value as clear portraits of 
their intellectual limits. Based on this skewed portrayal, students would then spend their adult 
lives perceptually bound by these artificial constraints on their capabilities.  
 Rex Jackson was not the only ETS figure to challenge Slack and Porter‟s claims during 
the early 1980‟s. Samuel Messick and Ann Jungeblut‟s article for the March, 1981, edition of 
Psychological Bulletin attempted to discredit those studies cited in Slack and Porter‟s defense of 
test coaching. According to the psychometricians, any attempt to legitimize test-prep via 
previous research was unreasonable because the extant literature “was methodologically flawed 
in various and divergent ways.”
276
  Most studies that validated test-coaching either lacked control 
groups or relied upon unscientifically-constructed control groups. More importantly, the results 
of most studies on test-prep were truly inconclusive because interested parties refused to set 
parameters on what exactly constituted test-coaching. As Messick and Jungeblut argued, the 
studies by Marron, Pallone, and others that upheld test-coaching relied on instructional practices 
so extensive as to be often interchangeable with actual classroom instruction, and as such, would 
be without any merit were students provided with a rigorous high school education.
277
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 This academic fascination with the future of standardized testing, and by extension, test-
prep, continued when the periodical American Psychologist devoted its October, 1981, edition to 
the subject. The guest editors for the issue were convinced that continued public discourse over 
standardized testing “[would] have lasting benefits” for American society.
278
 Psychologist Anne 
Anastasi contributed an article on test-coaching to the issue. Anastasi reaffirmed that test-prep 
had become an irrefutably vague concept, and that the confusion found in debates over test-prep 
was correspondent to the “pseudodistinctions” made by the American public about the many 
standardized tests used for educational and employment purposes.
279
 In turn, Anastasi insinuated 
that the College Board‟s recurrent disdain for the test-prep industry had a more refined logic in 
the advent of truth-in-testing legislation. Despite the College Board‟s aim to diminish students‟ 
test-wiseness by publishing its own line of preparatory material (discussed below), public 
schools and private enterprises that offered test-prep services only helped “reintroduce the very 
individual differences in narrowly defined test-taking skills.”
280
 That is, those who championed 
test-coaching as a way to combat the alleged unfairness of standardized testing were now causing 
inequity in the newly-transparent testing environment. 
 Unconvinced of the College Board‟s transformation, Slack and Porter again confronted 
the creators of the SAT in a 1982 New York Times-organized roundtable discussion. The editorial 
panel resolved little. Although Slack badgered College Board President George Hanford into 
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stating that the SAT was not designed to measure or suggest one‟s innate mental faculties, 
disagreements over the test‟s alleged cultural bias and predictive capabilities remained unsettled. 
Further, Hanford refused to define coaching any further than “drill in a short period of time,” 
even after Slack accused the College Board of “fraud in science” by selectively publicizing 
studies which purported that test-prep produced negligible gains.
281
 Like ETS‟s Rex Jackson two 
years prior, Hanford insisted that any studies with findings to the contrary had serious 
methodological flaws.  
 Amidst this academic back-and-forth, the United States Department of Education began 
to challenge the curricular trend toward teaching for specific tests. In a 1982 booklet for the 
federal department‟s National Institute of Education, Nancy Borkow sought to challenge the 
educational policy direction of “modifying [school] curriculums to emphasize the basics” for the 
sake of raising standardized test scores.
282
  The protracted decline of SAT scores, as well as those 
of other aptitude and achievement tests, spurred many American secondary schools and school 
systems to reformat their curricula. Reading and mathematics had taken precedence over other 
subjects, which were themselves reoriented toward reading and mathematics instruction, e.g., 
reading-through-science and reading-through-history. Borkow noted that average SAT scores for 
male and female test-takers in both subjects continued to decline in the 1980s, several years after 
the educational reemphasis on basics began. Although the average SAT scores for 1981 “[had] 
                                                        
281
 Margot Slade, ―A Roundtable: Scoring the S.A.T.,‖ New York Times, October 24, 1982: E22, ProQuest 
Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2007), 
http://ezproxy.lib.ucf.edu/login?url=/docview/121892434?accountid=10003 (last accessed March 12, 2011). 
282
 Nancy Borkow, National Institute of Education, ―Analysis of Test Score Trends: Implications for 
Secondary School Policy—A Caution to Secondary School Administrators‖ (Washington, D.C.: United States 
Department of Education, 1982), 1. 
 110 
remained stable with the 1980 results,” it was unclear at the time of publication whether the trend 
had reached a genuine nadir or merely stalled.
283
  
 Borkow maintained that this test-based curricular shift would create “a too-narrow focus 
on basics” in American secondary education.
284
 As high schools sought to ensure that all 
students grasped rudimentary mathematical and verbal concepts, fewer students became able to 
exhibit mastery at more advanced levels; American high school students were stuck at the lower 
orders of intellectual engagement. In turn, Borkow forecasted a dire irony for children introduced 
to basics-based education in primary school.  Although children would benefit from mastering 
rudimentary concepts in primary schooling, the back-to-basics focus in secondary schools would 
deny these students the opportunity to study advanced concepts later in their requisite education, 
thus “render[ing] the high school diploma essentially valueless.”
285
 
  Unsurprisingly, ETS concurred with Barkow‟s assessment; Donald Powers and Donald 
Alderman‟s 1983 study for the Journal of Educational Measurement concluded that attempts to 
perform better on the SAT through familiarization with the test‟s structure were fruitless. The 
authors maintained that the “test familiarization booklet […] Taking the SAT,” which had been 
distributed to SAT candidates since late 1978, produced no substantial increase in scores.
286
 
Despite including “a full-length sample test and answers to questions,” the booklet only had a 
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slightly positive influence on mathematics scores.
287
 Rather, the only improvement of genuine 
statistical significance was students‟ level of confidence. The message was clear. If clear and 
thorough familiarization with the SAT made students feel more comfortable without leading to 
significant increases in scores, then the test was well-written and the test-makers were behaving 
fairly. Therefore, coaching was a sham. 
288
 
 On the surface, the continued debate over test-prep, its parameters, and its usefulness 
ought to have hobbled the industry. The incredibly broad spectrum of practices that researchers, 
psychometricians, critics, and entrepreneurs regarded as SAT-coaching should have bred 
widespread consumer distrust. Instead, this vagueness and lack of consensus kept the industry 
afloat. If those parties with a vested interest in test-coaching could not concur on what it 
constituted, even in a broad sense, then claims that the industry profited from illegitimate 
practices were difficult to sustain. Rather, what remained sustained was the principle of 
legitimacy by default. Test-prep entrepreneurs could market their goods and engage in practices 
so long as they were not blatantly illegal. However, as will be seen with the actions of John 
Katzman and The Princeton Review, some test-prep enterprises purposely operated in the 
hinterlands of ethicality and legality in the 1980s, and became highly-profitable from doing so. 
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John Katzman, Clever Advertising, and the Limits of Copyright 
 The test-prep industry‟s acquisition of legitimacy during the 1980s also depended upon 
the development of formidable competition. During this decade, more test-prep companies 
gained national notoriety, and none more so than The Princeton Review (“TPR”). Founded in 
New York City in 1981 by John Katzman, The Princeton Review held an openly antipathetic 
view toward the SAT: one‟s results reflected nothing except one‟s ability to take that particular 
exam.
289
 But, for “between $500 and $600,” students could learn from TPR how to outwit the 
structure of the SAT in order to attain a higher score.
290
 Both Katzman and his associate Adam 
Robinson had experience in the test-prep industry prior to The Princeton Review. Katzman had 




 Glibly cynical, The Princeton Review‟s advertisements had a tenor and rhetoric starkly 
different than those of other test-prep companies. This style was noticeable even in TPR‟s 
earliest ads. One such ad, printed in the New York Times in August and September of 1981, 
sought to hook readers with the remark: “Some people have an Uncle on the Admissions 
Board…and some people have The Princeton Review.”
292
 While the ad copy was quick to note 
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that TPR classes were taught “by a staff of Ivy League alumni and undergraduates” using the 
latest in computer technology, it was mum on how much the eight-week SAT-prep course 
actually cost.
293
 Despite having the money to pay for boutique test coaching, and the luck to live 
in the greater New York City metropolitan area, students and parents were subtextually 
complimented in these ads for not being from an older order of established money and power. 




  The Princeton Review‟s advertisements were also openly critical of its competition, 
particularly Stanley H. Kaplan Educational Centers. A series of TPR ads printed in 1985 
triumphantly declared “WE SCORE MORE!”
295
 This exclamation was set below a slanted bar 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
all catalogued as such in ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2007), 
http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.lib.ucf.edu/hnpnewyorktimes/advanced?accountid=10003&language=En (all last 
accessed December 7, 2010). For similar early ads from TPR, please see: ―Classified Ad 19,‖ New York Times, 
September 8, 1981: C5; and ―Display Ad 754,‖ New York Times, September 13, 1981: E9; both catalogued as such 
in ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2007), 
http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.lib.ucf.edu/hnpnewyorktimes/advanced?accountid=10003&language=En (both 
last accessed December 7, 2010). 
 
293
 Ibid.  
 
294
 For examples of TPR ads with a similar sensibility, please see: ―Display Ad 569,‖ New York Times, May 
18, 1986: WC25; ―Display Ad 628,‖ New York Times, May 18, 1986: CN27; and ―Display Ad 557,‖ New York 
Times, June 8, 1986: CN26; all catalogued as such in ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-
2007), http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.lib.ucf.edu/hnpnewyorktimes/advanced?accountid=10003&language=En 
(all last accessed December 7, 2010). These ads assert that ―[i]f people have told you that you can‘t significantly 
increase your SAT score […] THEY LIED!‖ (Emphasis in originals.) This exclamation is placed in the top third of 
the advert, between two cartoons: on the right, a white student carrying books while curiously regarding the ad‘s 
hook; and on the left, an older white man in a three-piece suit, with folded arms and an upturned nose. This styling 
suggests (besides perhaps the race of most of the business‘s clientele) that TPR sought to present itself as a company 
in opposition to an older order of academic and social elite.  
 
295
 ―Display Ad 35,‖ New York Times, February 12, 1985: C11; ―Display Ad 388,‖ New York Times, 
February 17, 1985: WC30; ―Display Ad 468,‖ New York Times, June 2, 1985: WC16; ―Display Ad 379,‖ New York 
Times, August 18, 1985: ES64; ―Display Ad 547,‖ New York Times, August 25, 1985: CN16; ―Display Ad 526,‖ 
New York Times, August 25, 1985:WC21; ―Display Ad 299,‖ New York Times, September 1, 1985: CN19; ―Display 
Ad 277,‖ New York Times, September 1, 1985: WC17; ―Display Ad 595,‖ New York Times, September 8, 1985: 
WC25; all catalogued as such in ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2007), 
http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.lib.ucf.edu/hnpnewyorktimes/advanced?accountid=10003&language=En (all last 
accessed December 7, 2010); emphasis in originals. 
 114 
graph that showed the alleged improvement in students‟ SAT scores after various methods of 
coaching and preparation. Kaplan‟s bar for 50 points of improvement was dwarfed by the bar for 
The Princeton Review‟s 150, which expanded beyond the graph frame itself. Indeed, parents in 
Greater Metropolitan New York, Los Angeles, Boston, Chicago, and Atlanta were promised a 
“repeat [of a TPR] course at no additional cost” if their children could not improve their SAT 
scores by at least 120 points.
296
  
 A later ad for The Princeton Review in the 24 August, 1988, edition of the Wall Street 
Journal, was less cordial toward Kaplan. In bolded, all-capitalized, sans-serif font, the hook of 
the double-column ad quipped, “If You Can‟t Afford The Princeton Review, Stanley Kaplan Is 
An Acceptable Compromise.”
297
 The ad copy wryly mocked those who purchased an inferior, 
understaffed, and outdated Kaplan SAT prep course for the sake of frugality. The company‟s 
logo, a thick upward arrow, was paired with the slogan “The nemesis of standardized testing.”
298
  
Hence, the ad generated appeal by signaling to the reader that The Princeton Review stood in 
direct opposition to not only its competition, namely Kaplan, but also the testing industry itself. 
 Another ad for The Princeton Review, placed in the 25 February, 1988, edition of the 
Wall Street Journal‟s “Leisure & Arts” section, employed several clever techniques at once. The 
ad‟s hook, “Not everyone tests well,” was placed above a series of six comically drawn figures, 
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which were meant to illustrate the evolution from chimp to modern man.
299
  Each of these six 
figures was sequentially labeled “Week 1” to “Week 6,” suggesting that TPR could help any 
student become a “highly evolved” test-taker.  Furthermore, the ad‟s copy included snippet 
endorsements from both Rolling Stone and The Christian Science Monitor, perhaps in an attempt 
to lend credibility while playing to the sensibilities of both youth and parents. 
 However, the testimonial in this advertisement attributed to Rolling Stone was somewhat 
misleading. The blurb stated: 
Rolling Stone reports, “Princeton Review Students are being admitted to college 
that wouldn‟t have considered them before…When you raise a kid‟s score 200 or 
300 points, …you change his whole outlook about himself.”
300
 
While these phrases are attributable to an article for the 28 March, 1985, issue for Rolling Stone, 
the second sentence was not written by the piece‟s author, David Owen. Rather, this portion of 
the blurb was from a quote by Katzman himself as the second ellipses in this blurb simply erased 
“he says” from Owen‟s writing.
301
  Given Owen‟s highly positive portrayal of The Princeton 
Review, the company need not have resorted to specious quotations.  
 Further complicating Katzman‟s clever manipulation of his company‟s notoriety was the 
widespread success of his book Cracking the SAT. The 1986 bestseller was praised by 
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editorialists for “exposing the gimmicks and flaws of [… the] SAT.”
302
 For ten dollars, any 
student could learn how to manipulate the mechanics and structure of the SAT to their own 
benefit. By the mid-1980s, Katzman was not a businessman in the fringes of the test-prep 
industry, but rather a quickly-ascendant figure who would use relatively controversial behavior 
to his company‟s advantage.  
 However, Katzman‟s braggadocio and business practices occasionally crossed into 
unethical and illegal behavior, leading to a series of lawsuits and appeals between Katzman and 
Educational Testing Service during the mid-1980s.  The findings in these cases further 
entrenched the test-prep industry in a cat-and-mouse game with standardized test manufacturers 
over the legality of certain business practices. These legal actions began in August, 1985, when 
ETS filed a civil action against both Katzman and The Princeton Review in the United States 
District Court for New Jersey. ETS wanted to forbid the test-prep company from using several 
hundred “confidential test questions” allegedly pilfered by Katzman and his employees for TPR 
clients.
303
 Katzman and TPR were believed to have coached their clientele with “facsimile” 
versions of SAT-Math, SAT-Verbal, and other College Board test questions, causing nearly 300 
“secure” test questions slated for use in the 1985 versions of the SAT to be discontinued.
304
 As 
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noted by Judge Clarkson Fisher in his opinion for Educational Testing Service v. John Katzman 
and The Princeton Review, Inc., this theft likely constituted not only a violation of copyright law 
but also an “irreparable injury” to the integrity of ETS‟s standardized exams.
305
 Fisher found in 
ETS‟s favor, and granted a preliminary injunction in August, 1985.  
 However, the case summary for the preliminary injunction, as well as those for the formal 
injunction and its appeal, indicates that ETS had previously sought to settle with Katzman for his 
theft of this test material. In 1982, while The Princeton Review was a sole proprietorship, 
Katzman came under the possession of “certain Math and English Composition Achievement 
Tests,” and distributed material from these exams to his clientele prior to their official use by 
ETS.
306
 Katzman refused to reveal how he attained the material, but reached an accord with ETS 
the next year with the following terms: 
to return all copies of the purloined tests, to refrain from copying or distributing 
any ETS copyrighted or copyrightable materials or registering for or attending 
any test administered by ETS unless it was for bona fide purposes, and to notify 
ETS if any unlawfully obtained ETS tests came into [his] possession and provide 
ETS with information as to their source.
307
 
When this stolen material resurfaced in TPR‟s preparatory material two years later, ETS sought 
an enjoined injunction. Educational Testing Service supplemented its accusation of betrayal by 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
of those tests to registered examinees.‖ Any use of these questions by an outside party prior to ETS‘s formal release 
of the questions would thus entail not only copyright infringement but also outright theft.  
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documenting the various occasions after the agreement in which Katzman had registered to take 
the SAT himself, as well as attempted to order ETS materials.
308
 
 Judge Maryanne Trump Barry, also of the District Court of New Jersey, re-approached 
the lawsuit the following spring. She had to discern if ETS‟s pursuit of an injunction against 
Katzman, his company, and his associates was valid based on the grounds of territoriality and 
corporate accountability. That is, Barry needed to decide whether Katzman‟s actions made him 
prone to New Jersey law despite being a New York resident, and whether Katzman was 
responsible for The Princeton Review‟s actions following the company‟s incorporation in 1984. 
The judge deduced that “Katzman [was] amenable to suit in New Jersey,” and that his 1983 
arrangement with ETS was a valid precedent to establish his contacts in the state, despite its 
correlative relationship to the case at hand.
309
 Katzman‟s counterclaims were largely denied, and 
ETS‟s injunction was upheld. 
 The case was subsequently brought to the United States Third Circuit Court of Appeals. 
Judge Dolores Sloviter, writing on behalf of the appellate court, upheld the notion that 
Katzman‟s actions were unjustifiable, regardless of the alleged misdeeds of ETS. Indeed, 
Sloviter regarded any educational benefits of The Princeton Review as far too minimal to 
consider the copyright breach as fair use on academic grounds.
310
 Yet, Sloviter declared that a 
large portion of the injunction was too broad. Given that the prohibition of “‟adapting‟ ETS‟ 
materials may [have encompassed] permissible use of ETS‟ material,” Katzman and TPR were 
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unduly prevented by the injunction from potential legitimate business practices.
311
 Amendments 
aside, the injunction held, and Katzman and his company were still amenable to trial for 
copyright infringement.  
 According to Zena Woldeyesus, the Third Circuit‟s ruling against Katzman and The 
Princeton Review set a dangerous precedent for the standards of fair market practices. 
Woldeyesus notes that as for-profit enterprises, The Princeton Review and other “similar indirect 
competitors” were seen as unfair threats to ETS‟s non-profit operations.
312
 Yet, ETS‟s non-profit 
designation was itself flimsy, as it was more realistically a quasi-monopolistic enterprise with 
for-profit subsidiaries. Hence, litigious measures taken by a non-profit such as ETS against 
indirect competition could help shield the non-profit from public scrutiny of its own practices.  
 Further, Woldeyesus maintains that the Third Circuit‟s decision on the “facsimile” 
versions of SAT questions set up a slippery standard for intellectual property law. More 
specifically, the extension of a copyright from a compilation to “the individual material within 
th[at] compilation,” particularly when the individual questions tested common knowledge and 
largely lacked the element of originality and creative effort necessary to gain copyrights on their 
own merit, gave unnecessary power to those with the monetary means to defend the breadth of 
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  The Third Circuit‟s decision allowed ETS (and, in turn, whatever party with 
enough money) to copyright algebraic concepts, grammar principles, and other utterances that 
were seemingly guaranteed to be outside the scope of copyright.
314
   
 The convoluted nature of ETS‟s legal battle with Katzman and TPR exposed the 
necessary element of artifice within the test-prep industry. Following Woldeyesus‟s logic, the 
material found on the SAT was largely within the realm of common knowledge and largely 
outside the realm of individual-item copyright, and thus only had the element of originality when 
viewed in its entirety.
315
  Conversely, following the Third Circuit‟s logic, the common 
knowledge or factual material tested by standardized exams did not negate the copyrightable 
nature of the question forms or language used to ask questions. That is, standardized test 
questions may have been copyrightable for how they asked rather than what they asked, and thus 
did not run afoul of “the principle of merger between the idea and expression.”
316
  In either 
instance, the legal and business legitimacy of test-prep companies could not rest in their 
preparatory material‟s verisimilitude to standardized test material. Instead, the packaging of their 
preparatory material was most important.  
 The Princeton Review and Kaztman‟s actions demonstrated that the legitimacy of the 
test-prep industry during the 1980s hinged upon companies displaying distinguishable attitudes 
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toward the SAT and standardized testing in general. Unlike Kaplan‟s largely positive appraisal of 
the SAT, The Princeton Review publicly held it in contempt, so much so that Katzman would 
later liken the exam to “a cancer.”
317
 Indeed, Katzman claimed that his legal defeat was actually 
a victory as the two years and hundreds of thousands of dollars ETS invested in its lawsuit only 
led to a reward of “$52,000 in damages” and massive growth in The Princeton Review‟s 
business.
318
 Taken at face value, Katzman‟s statements were absurd. Only the most foolish or 
zealous businessmen would want to destroy the industry on which their enterprise was based. 
However, publicly sharing a disdain for the exam with one‟s key demographic was shrewd, as 
allowing clients to believe that their choice in test-prep was genuinely different would create 
handsome profits for Katzman and his company.  
Association, Acquisition, and the Money Game 
 The previous chapter showed that the test-prep industry did not always acquire legitimacy 
through its own direct actions during the 1960s and 1970s. However, in the 1980s, certain test-
                                                        
317
 Tony Schwatrz, ―The Test Under Stress,‖ New York Times, January 10, 1999: Magazine 33, ProQuest 
Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2007), 
http://ezproxy.lib.ucf.edu/login?url=/docview/110087775?accountid=10003 (last accessed March 13, 2011). 
Katzman‘s vitriol toward the test did not necessarily grow with time. In the above cited Rolling Stone article, 
Katzman dismissed the SAT as ―‘bullshit‘‖; see: Owen, ―Adam and John Say Put Your Pencil Down,‖ 80. 
Coincidently, Katzman‘s epithet for the SAT in Owen‘s article became a heavily insinuated motif in a series of TPR 
ads printed in early 1986. For several examples printed in the New York Times, please see: ―Display Ad 415,‖ New 
York Times, January 19, 1986: CN21; ―Display Ad 391,‖ New York Times, January 19, 1986: WC23; ―Display Ad 
465,‖ New York Times, January 26, 1986: CN20; ―Display Ad 443,‖ New York Times, January 26, 1986: WC24; 
―Display Ad 402,‖ New York Times, February 2, 1986: CN23; ―Display Ad 377,‖ New York Times, February 2, 
1986: WC20; ―Display Ad 438,‖ New York Times, February 9, 1986: WC22; ―Display Ad 449,‖ New York Times, 
February 16, 1986: CN22; and ―Display Ad 425,‖ New York Times, February 16, 1986: WC22; all catalogued as 
such in ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2007), 
http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.lib.ucf.edu/hnpnewyorktimes?accountid=10003 (accessed 7 December, 2010). 
318
 Lee Mitgang, ―Educational Testing Service Wins Copyright Victory Over Coaching Firm,‖ Associated 
Press Wire, December 23, 1987: AM cycle, LexisNexis Academic 
http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.lib.ucf.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/ (last accessed December 1, 2010). 
 122 
prep companies gained legitimacy through their association with and acquisition by other non-
educational corporations. In November, 1984, the Washington Post Company entered into an 
“agreement in principle” to purchase Kaplan.
319
 In exchange for Kaplan, Inc. becoming a 
subsidiary of the media company, Stanley Kaplan would retain his position as CEO for an 
additional 10 years following the purchase. Richard D. Simmons, who was the president of 
Washington Post Company at the time, indicated a desire to broaden Kaplan‟s scope and reach. 
Simmons was eager to bring Kaplan to overseas markets as well as expand its domestic clientele, 
particularly for SAT prep. Despite the $35 million Kaplan earned from its preparatory services in 
1984, the company had reached “only a small percentage” of high school students who took the 
SAT in the previous year.
320
  
 In the company‟s initial several years as a subsidiary, Kaplan remained a relatively minor 
entity, especially in comparison to Washington Post Company‟s flagship newspaper and 
Newsweek magazine. During the 1980‟s, Kaplan was categorized as part of Washington Post 
Company‟s “Other Businesses,” which included “a database publisher[ ]and cellular telephone 
operations in Miami.”
321
  These motley holdings provided only six percent of Washington Post 
Company‟s revenues in 1987. In the same fiscal year, these companies generated roughly US 
$8.56 million in revenues. While this was a considerable improvement from the roughly US 
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 However, the Washington Post Company‟s annual reports to stockholders during the late 
1980s illustrate how profitable the newspaper magnate and the test-prep company would become 
for each other. Between the time of its acquisition and the end of the decade, Kaplan‟s revenues 
“ha[d] increased nearly [eighty] percent.”
323
 Corollary, the company‟s clientele base grew under 
the supervision of Washington Post Company. In 1987 alone, Kaplan had over 100,000 
customers, a figure that increased by twenty percent in the following two years.  
 Kaplan also expanded its physical presence under the auspices of Washington Post 
Company. The company opened centers “in Stamford, Connecticut; Lawrence, Kansas; 
Bethesda, Maryland; and Grand Rapids, Michigan” in 1987.
324
 The following year, four more 
permanent offices were opened “in Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania[;] Norfolk, Virginia[;] and Boca 
Raton and Jacksonville, Florida.”
325
 By the end of the 1980s, Kaplan operated in 137 locations, 
having expanded to “Monmouth County and Cherry Hill, New Jersey; Lincoln, Nebraska; 
Spokane, Washington; and Colorado Springs, Colorado.”
326
  Kaplan and in turn, the test-prep 
industry, was no longer confined to major metropolitan areas of the country as Kaplan was 
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spreading into commuting communities and secondary cities across the country. The industry 
was more legitimate because its premium goods were no longer foreign or unattainable to those 
outside of major urban areas. 
 When discussing the physical spread of the test-prep industry during the 1980s, it may 
also be useful to consider how American income levels changed throughout the decade. In 1980, 
the median American household income was $17,710, roughly double of what it had been 
($8,734) ten years prior; mean American household income levels also increased in a similarly 
proportional manner.
327
 However, the rate of inflation was so steady during the 1970s that 
Americans possessed less purchasing power in the early 1980s than at any time in the previous 
decade.
328
  That said, the rate of inflation affected different families in different fashions. 
Nonwhites continued to earn drastically less money than their white counterparts. In 1978, the 
median income for white households was $15,660, whereas African-American households had a 
median income of $9,411. By 1982, that gap had increased as white households had a median 
income of $21,117, while African-American households had a median income of $11,968.
329
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 The difference in income levels based on educational attainment was equally stark. While 
the average high school dropout earned $17,469 in 1983 (down from $17,517 the year prior), the 
typical high school graduate earned $24,506. Meanwhile, college graduates had a median income 
of $37,467—over fifty percent greater than that for high school graduates. This figure was a 
considerable increase from their median income of $35,778 in 1982. However, a baccalaureate 
degree itself was not the sole educational means for Americans to receive a higher income; 
Americans who had attended college but did not receive a four-year degree had an average 
income of $29,097 in 1983.
330
 That same year, the income-gap between those who had a high 
school diploma and those who had attended, but did not graduate from, university widened to 
$4,591, up from $3,606 the year prior.
331
 
 Such discrepancies continued throughout the rest of the 1980s. In 1987 American 
households headed by a high-school graduate had a median income of $25,190, which was 
nearly $800 lower than the median income for all American households that year. Meanwhile, 
those households headed by an individual with some undergraduate college education had a 
median income of $30,435. (Households led by a college graduate had a median income of 
$43,073.)
332
 This income gap between those with some college and those without any college 
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was present even when accounting for race and ethnicity. White and Hispanic households headed 
by those with one to three years of college education head median income levels roughly 18.6 
percent higher in 1987 than their respective counterpart households led by individuals with only 
a high school diploma. For African-American households that year, the difference was nearly 
23.4 percent.
333
 This gap also remained considerable when factored by gender. Between 1987 
and 1989, male “year-round, full-time workers” with some undergraduate college education 
earned at least 15.8 percent more than those with only a full high school education.
334
  The 
difference was at least 19.8 percent when accounting for all males in the workforce. For females, 
the minimum gaps in the same period were 20.5 percent for full-time workers, and 36.4 percent 
for the female workforce in general. 
 At the end of the 1980s, over 15.8 million American households were led by individuals 
with some undergraduate education. Although more American households were headed by 
individuals with high school diplomas alone (over 31.2 million) or baccalaureate degrees 
(roughly 20.4 million), this demographic group was a sizeable component of all American 
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 The presence of an income gap between high school graduates and college 
attendants, coupled with growth of major test-prep enterprises outside of primary urban areas, 
may have reinforced the pragmatic uses of both the SAT and the test-prep industry. If one was 
more likely to make more money by completing some college, and if one‟s opportunity to attend 
college was greater than ever, then the burden of a degree itself may have been lessened. 
Simultaneously, prep was more available than before, in an increasingly broader price range 
albeit of varying quality. A 1984 report by the New York State Consumer Protection Board 
revealed that the courses run by test-prep companies operating within the state had “tuitions 
[ranging from] $35 to $1,008.”
336
 In a sense, the primary wage concern for the broader pool of 
SAT candidates was no longer even getting a degree from the college or university that was the 
best fit for them. It was merely getting some college, any college, under their belt. Test-prep of 
any type could be a relatively inexpensive means to this end.   
Playing the Fool 
 The expansion of the test-prep industry was further complicated by the College Board‟s 
decision to produce its own line of test-prep materials in the late 1970s and early 1980s.  The 
original version of the College Board‟s preparatory material, 4 SATs, was a direct consequence 
of truth-in-testing legislation. The popularity of this publication led to more extensive editions, 
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leading to the commercially-sold publication 10 SATs in 1983.
337
 “[F]or about $9,” a student 
could acquaint himself with the SAT through previously-used versions of the exam.
338
 As David 
Owen implied in an article on test-prep material, most SAT guides and tutorials on the market at 
that time were evidently ill-suited for preparing students for the actual exam. Many guides, such 
as those produced by Gruber and Arco, either mangled the logical structure of question types or 




 The College Board‟s decision to release previously-used SATs may be seen as the 
organization‟s successful attempt to remain viable after truth-in-testing legislation had forced the 
standardized testing industry to operate with unprecedented transparency.  In turn, the decision to 
commercially publish obsolete material allowed the College Board to maintain the appearance 
that truth-in-testing legislation would not hobble the quantity or quality of its testing content. The 
implication was clear. The College Board could dispose of old tests because it would always be 
able to outmaneuver its indirect competition. At the very least, ETS and the College Board 
always had the option of altering the structure and content of the exam if the material was found 
to be too trainable.  
 However, to be surprised that the publication of actual SATs by its own creators did not 
hobble the test-prep industry is to ignore the complicated relationship between those who make 
the test and those who coach for the test. The publication 10 SATs could only prompt test-prep 
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companies to align their preparatory material more closely with that which was actually tested on 
the SAT in order to remain credible. One could also argue that the affordability of The Princeton 
Review‟s Cracking the SAT stemmed partially from the low price of the College Board‟s own 
publication. Further, if ETS and the College Board still retained the right to revise the structure 
and content of the SAT, then the test-prep companies may have served as trustworthy, or at least 
tolerated, guides through the evolution of the exam. Meanwhile, the injunction against Katzman 
and TPR kept an undefined check on test-prep companies from adapting material too-close in 
resemblance to the College Board‟s published material. 
 Given the continued decline of SAT scores following New York State‟s truth-in-testing 
legislation, the College Board also may have well understood that the aggregate national SAT 
scores for students were not vulnerable to coaching, and that the market pressures as well as 
debates over pedagogical theory would prevent test-prep from ever truly making a severe impact 
on national SAT score trends. The College Board adhered to this mindset even when SAT scores 
finally began to improve. In 1982, national average SAT scores rose for the “first time in 19 
years,” up three points from the previous year‟s figures.
340
 The average combined math and 
verbal scores for American students had inched up to 893 points, but this figure was eighty-seven 
points lower than the national SAT average score for 1963, when students‟ performance levels 
on the exam began to erode. The College Board‟s denial of test-prep‟s impact on national SAT 
scores may have allowed the organization to better rationalize that their own study guide was 
merely a familiarization device and thus had no genuine impact on scores.
341
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 The College Board‟s ambiguous arrival to the test-prep industry was in sharp contrast to 
the National Association of Secondary School Principals‟ blatant entry into the market in 1982. 
The nonprofit organization designed their SAT-prep program to be used in the classroom, 
integrated within extant curricula. Given that the organization‟s program was intended to be used 
over “20 weeks […for] 40 minutes a day,” one could surmise that the NASSP had hoped to 
create semester-long courses of SAT-prep strictly designed around their own software.
342
 In turn, 
by creating “not only workbooks and teachers‟ manuals but [also] six videotapes and three 
computer programs,” the NASSP sought to cater to schools with varying levels of media.
343
 
Regardless of the version of NASSP-designed SAT-prep that a school administrator decided to 
provide to his or her school, “the program would cost about $1500.”
344
 Several hundred students 
could receive long-term SAT coaching at a lesser cost than five students independently enrolling 
in a prep course at Kaplan. 
  The NASSP‟s test-prep ambitions were part of a broader expansion by the industry into 
computer media. As seen by Harcourt Brace Jovanovich‟s program Computer S.A.T., the original 
test-prep material for the medium was not particularly intuitive, nor entirely computerized. 
Consumers of Computer S.A.T. spent $70 (over $150 in 2010 dollars) for a program that offered 
little innovation beyond the ability to fill in “the answer blanks [that appeared] on the computer 
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 By the mid-1980‟s, certain computer-based SAT-prep programs offered greater 
customization. Barron‟s software provided students “a comprehensive 10-week program, a two-
week cram session, [and] a two-day panic mode.”
346
 Nonetheless, early consumers of test-prep 
computer software may have been willing to sacrifice preparatory capabilities for convenience 
and novelty. 
 The ability of educational organizations such as the NASSP to sponsor SAT-prep 
programs as well as the industry‟s widespread fascination with computer media would have been 
far less possible had the College Board been less coy with its intentions for commercially 
publishing 10 SATs. If the test-makers were more adamant about the direct preparatory benefits 
of using obsolete SATs, then test-prep companies may have been rendered obsolete. Given the 
College Board‟s decades-long stance and lingering dubiousness over test-coaching, such an 
outcome would have been highly unlikely, and may have tarnished the organization‟s credibility. 
Conversely, truth-in-testing legislation compelled test-prep companies to produce preparatory 
material with seemingly greater relevance to the actual SAT in order to remain credible and 
profitable, or at least to embrace new media in order to deflect criticism. These actions 
compelled the College Board to redesign the test whenever necessary. In a sense, both the test-
makers and the test-coachers now held genuine leverage against each other. Rather than use such 
leverage too forcefully, each side chose to engage symbiotically by the late 1980s, thus 
generating maximum profits for all involved.  
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Conclusion 
 During the 1980s, the test-makers and test coaches had to engage with each other in a 
rhetoric that was at least nominally antagonistic. To have done otherwise would have jeopardized 
the integrity of either side. Despite this façade of competition, standardized test manufacturers 
had ensnared themselves in a codependent relationship with the test-prep industry. To this end, 
the decisions of the Third Circuit in the ETS v. Katzman cases should not be viewed as dangerous 
precedents for copyright law, but rather the means to compel further interdependency between 
test-makers and test-coaches. Test-prep companies had to ensure that their coaching material was 
distinct enough from the actual SAT as well as competing companies‟ material in order to avoid 
copyright infringement. However, the College Board‟s increasingly enigmatic position on test-
coaching, reinforced with the commercial publication of obsolete versions of the SAT, gave the 
test-prep industry greater leeway in developing methodologies and techniques that could 
convince their target audience that test-prep would divine the seemingly ineffable metrics of the 
SAT. 
 With this, it may be argued that the test-prep industry had heretofore relied on potential. 
That is, the threat that test-prep had posed to standardized testing during the 1960s and 1970s 
had been little more than the potential havoc that test coaching may have had on the SAT and 
other facets of psychometry. Until the early 1980s, test-prep had not been available to enough 
students in enough capacities that acquisition of a test-prep company seemed like a sound 
business venture, particularly for corporations with little, if any, connection to standardized 
testing or education.  
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 While one must acknowledge Nairn‟s argument that standardized testing, and by 
extension test-prep, reinforced and broadened socioeconomic gaps, one must also acknowledge 
that the test-prep industry had broadened to such a point in the 1980s that test-prep was available 
to different socioeconomic groups. More fairly, Nairn‟s analysis did not portend the 
unwillingness for any party to define what test-prep truly entailed. Instead, it may be more 
reasonable to surmise that a broad spectrum of preparatory material was available for a wide 
array of price points, and the truly socioeconomically discriminatory element to this was 
business was the alleged quality and thoroughness of the preparatory material certain audiences 
could afford,  
 If Alderman and Power‟s 1983 study lends any insight into ETS‟s opinion about test 
coaching, then it does show the nonprofit‟s stance was quite simple: test coaching, regardless of 
who supplies it, does not genuinely improve scores. Given the rulings in ETS v. Katzman, the 
threat of test-prep to standardized testing‟s integrity was no longer based on how well a student 
improved on a standardized exam, but rather the preparatory material‟s degree of similarity to 
ETS‟s own copyrighted material. So long as test-prep materials, courses, books, and computer 
programs did not cross the threshold of copyright infringement, ETS would not genuinely care 
about said coaching‟s efficacy.  
 In short: by the early 1980‟s, ETS realized that while it could not eliminate “[t]he $60-
million-a-year test-aid industry,” it could keep a leash on the industry‟s public perception.
347
 If 
ETS and the College Board willingly gave candidates practice material for the SAT, then it came 
with both implicit and reported messages that such measures did not affect the integrity of the 
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exam; consumers could get the perception than any such prep was a waste of time. Those who 
could only afford prep books or other relatively inexpensive forms of test-prep could more easily 
disregard The Princeton Review, Kaplan, and other prep companies as a waste of money. Why 
spend hundreds of dollars being pampered and coddled through one‟s SAT prep when several 
dollars‟ worth of self-directed practice with a book would suffice? Meanwhile, those who could 
afford more expensive versions of test-prep could believe their purchases were more genuine.  
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CONCLUSION: FINAL REMARKS AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
 Invariably, a historical essay must reckon with its audience a greater point. It must give a 
suitable answer to “So?” Hopefully, this essay has clearly addressed the more narrow lines of 
relevance. The test-prep industry found acceptability by burrowing into the intersection of 
business and education. Certain test-prep companies brokered legitimacy through the rhetorical 
devices in their advertising. The legitimacy for the industry at-large was gained by default as 
neither the American government nor the American public could conclusively demonstrate that 
the industry conducted wholesale fraud. The standardized test manufacturers were forced to 
engage in a cat-and-mouse game of pseudo-antagonism and adaptation with the test-prep 
industry once truth-in-testing laws prescribed transparent operations in standardized testing. 
Such developments affect the current state of American standardized testing, its fluctuating but 
ubiquitous presence in the college admissions process, and the perpetuation of the test-prep 
industry decades after its origins.  
 Ideally, broader links of relevance have also been shown through this research. Most 
simply: when we acknowledge the intersections of business and education, we are better able to 
understand how the notion of a “proper education” is created, and in turn, how we relate 
education to the broader pursuit of a “proper” life. When practices that were once considered 
unacceptable such as paying for coaching on standardized admission exams become routine, it is 
crucial to apply historical scrutiny: “How” and “why did this happen?” The downside to living in 
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a highly ahistorical society is the tendency for Americans to believe that what is today has 
always been. Lesko‟s argument on the naturalization of adolescence can be applied to 
contemporary American culture and society at large.
348
  
 Obviously, the research conducted for this thesis can be drawn upon for further, better 
historical work on the test-prep industry. Other scholars might wish to explore this topic along 
different lines. Most glaringly, this thesis largely sidesteps the relationship between standardized 
testing and civil rights in American education during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. While this 
decision was largely in deference research already conducted and squarely focused on this topic, 
future research must address the relationship of race and the test-prep industry more forthrightly. 
Another suitable avenue may involve determining the industry's place in the broader field of 
proprietary and extracurricular education. Future research may include analysis of the roles and 
structures of earlier private instructional and educational businesses, and if they influenced how 
test-prep enterprises later developed. More broadly, future researchers may want to incorporate 
the history of the test-prep industry more fully into the history of the informal sector of American 
education. 
 This topic may be better suited for the field of urban history. In particular, urban 
historians may wish to explore the relationship between American suburbanization and the 
spread of test-prep enterprises throughout the country. Historians of New York City may find it 
worthwhile to trace the spread of test-prep companies throughout the boroughs and broader 
metropolitan area in order to determine how the industry grew within the city. Corollary to this, 
sociologists and cultural anthropologists who have a fascination with New York City may 
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consider tracing the relationship between neighborhoods‟ socioeconomic levels and the 
preponderance of test-prep proprietorships, public schools, and private schools within each 
respective neighborhood. Such a project could also be reasonable for those urban areas with a 
long history of test-prep or college preparatory enterprises.  
 Clearly, this topic would benefit from the work of those historians with expertise in the 
history of advertising and print media, particularly with small- to mid-circulation newspapers. A 
great deal of the research conducted for this essay would not have been possible had it not been 
for the work of those individuals determined to digitize and digitally archive mid-century 
newspapers--including advertisements. Once the archives of American mid-century publications 
are more fully digitized, future researchers can determine when the test-prep industry appeared in 
certain American communities, how these businesses advertised, if competition was quick or 
slow to develop, and whether companies employed novel advertising techniques, imagery, or 
rhetoric.  
 
 Hopefully, this thesis has demonstrated that the test-prep industry is more than a bizarre 
side note in the broader story of American education. Rather, it could be said that the practices of 
test-prep companies have served as the seam between approaches to American education during 
the twentieth century and those of the past decade. To this end, the test-prep industry is now 
legitimate because it is inextricable. These companies are too entwined in the daily flow of 
American education to be excised without considerable consequence to the contemporary 
structure of education in this country. 
  With this, to portray the test-prep industry writ large as the means for relatively affluent 
youth to secure entry into acclaimed postsecondary institutions and, thus, secure their lifestyle 
and socioeconomic power is to personify the actions of the entire industry by those of a select 
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number of businesses. Yes, the longevity of the industry has depended upon a consumer base 
with discretionary income even in the case of relatively inexpensive trade paperback study 
guides, as well as a social climate that regards postsecondary education as an increasingly 
indispensable milestone in contemporary life. However, the sustainability of the industry, 
regardless of various entities' business strategies or operating mantras, has been rooted in the 
understanding that standardized testing and entrance examinations have a limit to their 
quantitative and psychometric capabilities, and that standardized testing is itself too entrenched 
in contemporary American education to be winnowed away in any substantial fashion during the 
near future. As long as concerns about the ethicality, comprehensiveness, and applications of 
standardized testing are addressed by working within educational structures dependant upon 
standardized testing and entrance exams, the test-prep industry (and its many offspring) will 





APPENDIX: THE COURSE OF THE TEST-PREP INDUSTRY, 1990-2010 
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 Of course, the test-prep industry did not suddenly stop evolving at the end of the 1980s. 
To that end, the timeline of this thesis may seem somewhat arbitrary. Why not end the story in 
1992, or 1999, or 2010? Hopefully, what has become apparent throughout this essay is that, 
between the late 1940s and late 1980s, the test-prep industry at-large acquired and generated 
enough legitimacy to ensure that future actions of individual enterprises would not jeopardize the 
stability of the entire industry. Nonetheless, the industry at-large did exhibit certain trends and 
undergo several changes in the past two decades.  
 The cycle of pseudo-antagonism and symbiotic adaptation between standardized test 
manufacturers and test-prep companies continued well into the 1990s and new century. 
Following another decline in national average composite SAT scores in 1991, the College Board 
and ETS made considerable alterations to the SAT in the mid-1990s. Beginning in 1994, test-
takers were granted the use of calculators, and were provided a set of questions for which they 
had to “figure out the answer instead of having [a] list of options.”
349
 A decade later, the test-
makers incorporated a mandatory essay as part of a new writing and grammar component to the 
exam.
350
 Despite claims to the contrary by various test-prep companies, the College Board 
asserted that these revisions to the SAT made the exam considerably less coachable. In turn, both 
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ETS and the College Board continued to publish research that alleged the relative inefficacy of 
SAT prep courses.
351
   
 Yet, many test-prep companies were not fearful of these alterations, per se. John 
Katzman, who openly mocked the new SAT essay as an exercise in “earnest, long-winded, and 
predictable” writing, was not concerned with structural changes to the SATs so much as the 
continued heavy use of major standardized entrance exams in the American educational 
system.
352
 This sentiment can be found in TPR‟s 2000 S-1 filing for the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, in which the company announced its intentions to publicly trade a portion of its 
common stock through NASDAQ. Detailing the many ways that investing with The Princeton 
Review could be a hazard for potential shareholders, the report cautions that, “[i]f the use of 
standardized tests declines or falls out of favor with educational institutions or state and local 
governments,” then The Princeton Review may be rendered a relatively baseless enterprise.
353
 
However, the S-1 report does not indicate a fear over actual changes to the SAT, ACT, or other 
tests. TPR assumed any version of these exams would be flawed enough to be trainable to its 
clientele, and thus, remain profitable for the company.  
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 However, The Princeton Review‟s S-1 report, along with the Washington Post 
Company‟s SEC filings from the same time period, show that certain test-prep enterprises had 
intentions of encroaching upon other educational pursuits. By 1999, TPR had expanded into 
“high-end college admissions counseling” through its branch Princeton Review 121, as well as 
“academic assessment, remediation, and enrichment services to children in grades three through 
eight” through its subscription-based website Homeroom.com.
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  Meanwhile, Kaplan segued 
into providing higher education itself by founding Concord University School of Law in 1998. 
Customers could now attend “the nation‟s first school [to offer] a juris doctor degree earned 
wholly online.”
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 Two years later, Kaplan acquired Quest Education Corporation. By 
purchasing an already-accredited network of post-secondary institutions, Kaplan could grant 
degrees in “healthcare, business, information technology, and fashion and design” while 
becoming eligible to receive federal student aid funds, thus allowing the Washington Post 
Company a generous but precarious source of revenue.
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test manufacturers dallied with profitable arrangements. The nonprofit ETS entered into a ten-
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Service,” thus allowing ETS to better segue into providing computerized versions of its 
standardized entrance and certification exams.
357
 However, Sylvan‟s own pattern of acquisitions 
in the five-year period following its arrangement with ETS spurred the competing non-profit 
ACT, Inc. (formerly the American College Testing Program) to file a series of suits. ACT 
accused Sylvan of monopolistic behavior in the field of computer-based standardized testing.
358
 
 ACT‟s actions were not anomalous: the relationship between and among test-makers and 
test-prep enterprises continued to maintain its litigious tint in the 1990s and new century. Most 
notable was ETS‟s lawsuit against Kaplan. The test-maker accused the test-prep company of 
fraud and malicious intent after Kaplan sent a group of employees to identify weaknesses in 
ETS‟s computerized version of the Graduate Record Exam (“GRE”).
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 In addition, Kaplan 
found itself in suit with the Ronkin Educational Group. Ronkin, which controlled the College 
Bound chain of tutoring centers in South Florida, sued Kaplan for unfair business practices after 
College Bound was forced to declare bankruptcy.
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 The former owners of College Bound, 
George and Janet Ronkin, were later convicted of securities fraud.
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 The advent of the Internet placed Kaplan increasingly at odds with its main competitor. 
Both Kaplan and The Princeton Review were embroiled in a lengthy battle of attrition over the 
rights to certain Internet domain names. TPR had purchased domain names that Kaplan alleged 
consumers would more reasonably associate with its own company, such as www.kaplan.com, in 
order to redirect Internet traffic to the Princeton Review website.
362
 The dispute was taken to a 
New York State arbitration panel, which “ruled that Princeton had to relinquish the [Internet] 
address to Kaplan.”
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 The Princeton Review and John Katzman were also embroiled in a dispute 
with former TPR associate Adam Robinson, who alleged that the company continued to profit 
from Robinson‟s work on TPR‟s commercially published test-prep books without giving 
Robinson due compensation in the several years following his formal disassociation with the 
company. Given Robinson‟s failure to establish that clear copyright infringement had occurred, 
as well as his inability to demonstrate why a federal court would have subject matter jurisdiction 
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 Monetarily speaking, the expansion and growth of the test-prep industry during the past 
two decades has been downright staggering, and increasingly premised on services outside of 
test-prep‟s original milieu. Of the nearly $4.57 billion of the Washington Post Company‟s 
reported revenue for its 2009 fiscal year, almost $2.64 billion came from Kaplan. However, over 
58 percent of Kaplan‟s revenue stemmed from its online university, law school, and Higher 
Education Campuses. Kaplan‟s Higher Education division generated over three times as much 
revenue in 2009 as its Test-preparation division. Curiously, “approximately 83%, of total Kaplan 
Higher Education revenues, and 49% of Kaplan, Inc. revenues,” or over one quarter of the 
Washington Post Company‟s entire revenues for 2009, came from federal student loans and 
grants.
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